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Abstract 
Industrial policy in the form of direct and indirect government subsidy provision to 
firms in specific sectors of the economy is a common sight in many countries. Some 
of the most often quoted examples are East Asian economies such as Japan and 
Taiwan. While industrial policy is touted as a possible engine to generate economic 
growth, empirical validations on the benefits from subsidy provisions have been 
mixed. It is often argued that a policy of non-intervention by the government may 
appear to be the optimal policy to pursue.  
However, this contrasts with historical observations of regular government 
subsidy provisions to firms in many countries. This thesis constructs a two-sector 
non-monetary macroeconomic model with monopolistic competition to examine 
welfare and other related effects of a subsidy provision by the government to firms 
financed by a proportional income tax. Firms in the monopolistically competitive 
sector receive a subsidy in the form of lump sum transfers or as some proportion of a 
variable cost component while firms in the perfectly competitive sector do not. 
The analysis is first carried out in an economy where labour supply is assumed to 
be exogenous and perfectly inelastic. This serves to provide a simple and clear 
exposition on the effects of a subsidy provision and to serve as a benchmark analysis 
to build upon. This is subsequently extended by allowing for labour supply to be 
endogenously determined to examine labour market effects of subsidy policies. The 
implications of subsidy provisions in the presence of international trade are studied 
by constructing a small open economy model where the effects of any policy 
implementation do not affect world prices or income. 
The principle findings we obtain are that when monopolistically competitive 
XI 
firms receive a cost-reducing subsidy, welfare improvements are always possible 
regardless of which cost variable the government subsidises. Furthermore, there is 
always a positive optimal subsidy which raises social welfare.  When the supply of 
labour is endogenous, the corresponding tax imposed on income will always induce 
an increase in labour supply. Trade is shown not to affect the principle findings: 
there remains an optimal level of subsidy which is Pareto-improving. A further 
implication in the open economy context is that the subsidy acts as a form of import-
substitution and export-promotion instrument which potentially alters the domestic 
economy’s trade patterns. 
 
 
 
1 
Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1. Preliminaries 
The broad theme of this thesis comes under the term ‘industrial policy’. As Pack and 
Saggi (2006) note, this term often implies different issues to different people and it 
is difficult to give an exact definition to it. We are not proposing any particular 
definition for industrial policy, since this is not what we are most concerned with 
here. However, to avoid any definition ambiguities for the rest of this thesis, we 
follow Pack and Saggi (2006) in defining it as “any type of selective government 
intervention or policy that attempts to alter the structure of production in favour of 
sectors……in a way that would not occur in the absence of such intervention in the 
market equilibrium.” 
We also clarify several other terms and characteristics which are used throughout 
this thesis. The economy we construct is a non-monetary economy and produces two 
classes of goods, an A- and a Y-good. The A-good is a homogeneous commodity 
which is produced and traded under perfect competition. This reflects goods that are 
very close substitutes and (potentially) low-skilled in production such that the 
quantity of factor inputs correspond directly to the quantity of output. Sectors that fit 
this description include the agricultural sector and low-skilled industries like 
garment manufacturing. As such, we will use the term ‘agriculture’ alongside 
‘homogeneous’ to refer to the A-good. 
The Y-good is a composite of differentiated varieties that have increasing returns 
to scale in production. This is synonymous with industrial sectors such as silicon 
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wafers and chemicals which require some considerable level of fixed or start-up 
costs before production can take place1. Thus, the terms ‘industry’, ‘differentiated’ 
and ‘manufacturing’ are taken as equivalent and will be used interchangeably to 
mean the Y-good. In our context, industrial policy thus refers to policy aimed at 
influencing the development of this sector of the economy. 
We shall further assume throughout that the economy consists of only one factor 
of production, labour. Labour is assumed to be homogeneous and mobile between 
sectors and paid a wage, w. Wages derived from the supply of labour make up the 
sole source of income in this economy. We also make an implicit assumption that 
the government intends for the Y-sector2 to expand and therefore, provides Y-firms 
with some form of production subsidy. Finally, the model is a static one and the 
government always practices a balanced budget. 
1.1.1. Objective 
Carlsson (1983) offers a list of a series of policy instruments which can potentially 
come under the term of industrial policy which includes, but is not restricted to, 
prohibitive tariffs, government ownership, labour market policy, etc. Specifically, 
what we are interested in exploring in this thesis is the use of industrial subsidies. 
We define subsidies to include different forms of transfer payments, denominated in 
monetary terms or in terms of the numeraire good, made by the government to firms 
and that contribute to a reduction in the firms’ costs of production. We want to 
explore the possible effects that arise as a result of the provision of such transfers 
from the government to firms. These include effects on the level of labour supply as 
                                                 
1  While monopolistic competition was credited to both Edward Chamberlin and Joan Robinson 
(Bellante, 2004), Harrod (1930) had previously provided a more methodological exposition of the 
effects that can arise from firms experiencing increasing returns to scale in production. 
2 This could perhaps stem from part of an industrialisation drive or some belief that there are benefits 
to be gained from expanding the Y-sector. 
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well as the allocative outcomes, the effect of subsidy provision on the level of total 
output in the Y-sector and welfare. We shall also consider whether there any optimal 
policy rules. 
Much of the existing economic literature, as recently surveyed by Pack and 
Saggi (2006), is concerned with empirical effects of subsidy provisions. To the best 
of our knowledge, the theoretical literature focussing on how the government can 
influence the level of production costs via the use of subsidies is somewhat less 
developed. A considerable amount of effort in the theoretical literature has been 
directed to study the use of fiscal policy in the economy but appears to be aimed to 
analysing the resulting outcomes when the government plays the role of a consumer, 
or where government expenditure is used for the purpose of aggregate demand 
management. Caraballo and Usabiaga (2006) provide a brief survey of some of the 
literature related to this aspect of fiscal policy. 
Thus, this thesis contributes to fill some of the existing gap in the existing 
theoretical literature on the effects subsidies can have in a wider macroeconomic 
setting. Specifically, our findings add on to the current literature in three ways: 
i. We show that monopolistic competition provides an avenue for a legitimate 
use of a tax-subsidy policy combination by a welfare-maximising 
government. 
ii. We illustrate and, where possible, derive the welfare-maximising level of 
subsidy to be given by the government. This is found always to be positive. 
iii. We find that supply side policies which reduce production costs of firms in 
the increasing returns to scale sector unambiguously yield a Pareto 
improvement. 
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1.1.2. Structure 
This thesis consists of 5 chapters and is presented such that Chapters 2, 3 and 4 can 
each be read individually if desired without any significant loss of continuity.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction and the motivation for 
the thesis. The model which we subsequently use for our analysis in the rest of this 
thesis is based on the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competition. 
In what follows, Section 1.2 puts forward the motivation for this thesis. We discuss 
the choice of the modelling technique briefly in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 covers 
briefly some literature on the use of fiscal policy in a monopolistically competitive 
economy. Section 1.5 concludes the chapter. 
The structure and coverage of the rest of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, 
we construct a one-factor, two-good (sector) general equilibrium macroeconomic 
model of a closed economy based on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Consumers derive 
utility from the consumption of the two types of goods, a homogeneous good and a 
differentiated one. The former is produced under perfectly competitive conditions 
while firms producing the latter have decreasing average costs of production. Labour 
wages are the only source of income in this economy. This chapter serves two 
purposes. The first is to examine if industrial policy in the form of subsidy 
provisions to the differentiated goods sector is welfare improving. The second is to 
derive and examine an optimal policy rule (if it exists). This serves as a benchmark 
analysis upon which the subsequent chapters will be built. We consider the use of 
three types of subsidy policies: a lump-sum transfer to firms, a per-unit production 
payment, and a subsidy to the average costs of production. In all cases, the subsidy is 
financed by a proportional tax on income. 
Chapter 3 expands on the results from the benchmark case. We extend the model 
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from the previous chapter by allowing the individual to vary his labour supply 
decision. There are two rationales for doing so. Allowing for an endogenously 
determined labour supply introduces a greater degree of realism and practical 
relevance into the model. Secondly, this provides us with the opportunity to examine 
the effect of the interaction between taxes and subsidies on labour supply – as a 
measure of the level of economic activity (or the degree of participation in the 
economy). The results derived from this chapter can provide insights that could 
potentially be useful for the purpose of labour market policy formulation. 
The analysis of both Chapters 2 and 3 are conducted within the context of a 
closed economy. However, the presence of large volumes of observed cross-border 
flows of goods and services between countries on a regular basis gives the 
motivation for Chapter 4. We thus extend the benchmark case by incorporating the 
presence of a foreign sector into the model. The domestic economy is modelled 
under the assumption that it is a price-taker in the world market, i.e. a small open 
economy. The introduction of trade flows into the analysis provides an avenue to 
examine the role that subsidies play in influencing the pattern of trade and welfare.  
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by recapitulating the primary findings together 
with a brief interpretation of the obtained results for possible policy relevance. 
Potential avenues for future research are also broached upon and suggested here.  
1.2. Motivation 
A story one hears regularly is how East Asian economies such as Japan, Singapore 
and Taiwan have experienced high economic growth as a result of heavy state 
involvement. For example, Lim (1991) documents some of the different ways by 
which public sector intervention, or ‘industrial targeting’, was an integral part of the 
industrialisation process in these countries. Some of the variety of mechanisms the 
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government uses comes in forms such as the provision of government-backed credit 
financing facilities, tax holidays and various trade instruments such as import tariffs 
or quotas and export subsidies. These are designed such that they provide incentives 
for the creation of an import-substituting or export-promoting industrial sector3. 
Yet, such policies are not confined to just East Asia. There is a large literature 
documenting the existence and use of industrial policies in various forms, as well as 
another set which analyses their use in a variety of scenarios. Sweden for example, 
had used subsidy payments to industrial manufacturing companies as a 
macroeconomic stabilisation tool (Carlsson, 1983). Santarelli and Vivarelli (2002) 
highlight the case of the Italian electronics sector where firms are provided with 
subsidies to encourage entry into the industry. Even for an economy that purportedly 
does not have a culture of an active industrial policy, Kehtels (2007) reports that 
large amounts of Federal targeted funding (to the tune of over US$40 billion 
annually) are continually provided in areas such as research and development and 
enterprise development in the USA. 
Apart from subsidies to existing industries, a study by Charlton (2003) notes that 
the chase for foreign direct investment between governments has given rise to 
situations where “Common investment incentive instruments include cash grants, 
corporate tax reductions, property tax abatements, sales tax exemptions, loans, loan 
guarantees, assistance with firm-specific job training funds and infrastructure 
subsidies”. This suggests therefore that subsidies are not an unimportant part of 
industrial policy, empirically speaking4. 
However, one must question the wisdom of subsidy provisions. Pack and Saggi 
                                                 
3 Examples which come to mind here include the automobile and semiconductor industries. 
4 As a digression, agricultural subsidies also form a substantial part of subsidy payments. An analysis 
of the welfare effects of agricultural subsidies can be found in Koo and Kennedy (2006). However, 
our focus here is with subsidies that are provided for the objective of some form of industrialisation 
policy. 
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(2006) address this issue by considering a series of market imperfections such as 
economies of scale in production and information and coordination failures as a 
theoretical basis and justification for governments to give out subsidies to firms. The 
presence of any of these characteristics signals a possible legitimacy for government 
action. Their conclusion, based on a review of the academic empirical literature, 
suggests that there stands no real justification for a government to intervene. Using 
measurement indicators such as total factor productivity, firm size and industry 
growth rates to analyse the impact of subsidies, it appears that the provision of 
subsidies give no added benefit. No intervention is likely to be the optimal policy 
stance to take. 
Why then, do subsidies continue to be used as a policy tool if they do not yield 
any benefit? Is there some theoretical backing which justifies this or are there other 
effects which give welfare gains to society but these are not captured in numerical 
indicators such as productivity and growth rates? This apparent conflict between 
casual observation of government behaviour and the results from empirical analyses 
gives us ample motivation to want to examine the effect of subsidies in greater detail 
in this thesis. 
1.3. Modelling Methodology 
1.3.1. Market Structure 
The market structure we adopt for our analytical model is based on the Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competition. There are several reasons for this 
choice. Firstly, as mentioned in Neary (2003), it is generally agreed that in reality, 
product markets are rarely perfectly competitive and that there are some degree of 
(internal) scale economies present. Secondly, in many of the papers mentioned, the 
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industry generally refers to either a host of firms within a particular industry sector 
or a combination of various industry sectors in the economy, all of whom involve 
some form of initial start-up or fixed costs that are not insignificant. Finally, in order 
to analyse the effects of subsidies fully, the market structure should be sufficiently 
tractable as to be embedded within a general equilibrium framework. 
Monopolistic competition presents itself as a suitable candidate as, following on 
from Chamberlin (1951), firms in this type of market form are assumed each to 
produce a good that is slightly different from the next, so each firm has some degree 
of monopoly power over its own product. Yet, the number of firms in the market is 
taken as sufficiently large to render any individual firm incapable of influencing 
market prices and with no consideration of any strategic interaction between firms5.  
While it could be argued that oligopoly would be a more ideal market structure, 
it has proven difficult to model it within a general equilibrium framework. One main 
obstacle to this is the possible absence of a stable equilibrium outcome as shown by 
Roberts and Sonnenschein (1977)6. Conversely, the assumptions that characterise 
monopolistic competition allow for the derivation of a stable equilibrium, making it 
ideal for our purpose here. 
1.3.2. Model 
Within the existing economic literature, there are a number of ways in which 
monopolistic competition is modelled. Norman and Thisse (1994) have assembled a 
collection comprising of the various contributions to this field which the interested 
reader is referred to. Within the existing economic literature, the Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977) model has become the ‘workhorse’ model of monopolistic competition 
                                                 
5 This can be argued as being valid in reality since industrial targeting implies that firms within the 
same targeted industry benefit collectively from the policy, or targeting is directed at distinct industry 
sectors altogether, such that there is little actual strategic interaction between them overall. 
6 Neary (2003) provides for a more complete discussion about the problems related to this. 
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largely because of its tractability in deriving explicit solutions. 
It should be mentioned here that the Spence (1976b) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) 
models are relatively similar. Brakman and Heijdra (2004) provide a very accessible 
review to which we refer the reader to. However, we highlight here why the Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977) model is more appropriate for use between the two. 
In both models, firms producing the differentiated good incur some level of fixed 
costs and a constant unit-specific marginal cost in production. This results in firms 
having increasing returns to scale, or decreasing average costs, of production. Each 
firm’s good is an imperfect substitute to the next with a constant elasticity of 
substitution between each variety. The differentiated good is modelled as a CES 
function in the form 
1
0
1
−
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
= ∫ σ
σ
σ
σ
diyY
N
i ,  (1.1) 
where the elasticity of substitution, σ, is 1>σ 7.  
However, Spence (1976b) models the individual’s utility function to be quasi-
linear8. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) take instead, the utility function to be of the form 
μμ −
=
1AYU ,   (1.2) 
 
where Y refers to the composite of differentiated goods, A is the homogeneous good, 
and μ and ( )μ−1  are the consumption shares of income to each class of good. This 
minor difference in formulation yields comparatively similar outcomes with respect 
to the Y-good, but the removal of any income effects renders the Spence (1976b) 
                                                 
7  Note that Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) utilised a discrete specification. However, given that N is 
assumed to be large in the Chamberlinian model, the continuous specification has become common in 
the macroeconomics, growth and trade literature: e.g. Dixit and Stiglitz (1974), reprinted in 
Braakman and Heijdra (2004); See also the discussion of the Dixit-Stiglitz model in Fujita et al (1999) 
for details. Clearly in the continuous specification, N does not define a number of firms, but a mass of 
firms.  
8 Spence (1976b) does not model this formally, but states that he “shall explicitly assume away 
income effects” from the onset. 
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analysis to be more partial equilibrium in nature9. Allowing for both income and 
substitution effects in both goods makes the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model more 
suited to a general equilibrium analysis. 
An example of an alternative modelling approach is the seminal contribution of 
Lancaster (1980) which follows on from his earlier work 10 . However, it is 
comparatively more unwieldy when placed within a general equilibrium framework 
as compared to the framework developed by Spence (1976b) and Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977) and we shall not cover it here11. The interested reader is referred to Lancaster 
(1980) and the collection by Norman and Thisse (1994) for coverage of the relevant 
literature. Thence, in line with much of the existing economic literature, we will use 
the Dixit-Stiglitz model for our analytical purposes in this thesis. 
1.4. Preliminary Background Literature 
A relatively substantial quantity of literature has arisen incorporating monopolistic 
competition as a market structure together with the incorporation of fiscal policy in 
some manner. This is generally encompassed under ‘New Keynesian Economics’ 
and the ‘New Trade Theory’ which has tended to suggest the use of fiscal policy as a 
means to bringing the economy to a higher level of welfare and efficiency. Subsidy 
provisions also come under this policy instrument. We therefore give a quick review 
of some of the relevant academic literature for preliminary insights and intuition.  
Solow (1998) provides an intuitive introduction to the effects monopolistic 
competition can bring to the macroeconomy. Paraphrasing, the existence of a 
monopolistically competitive equilibrium yields an outcome which he terms as a 
                                                 
9 This is mentioned and covered in Chapter 3 of Dixit (1990).  
10 See the references within Lancaster (1980). 
11 This approach was also critiqued with regards to the consistency of results obtained. See Hendler 
(1975). 
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case of ‘excess supply’ – i.e. firms are always willing to supply more output at the 
prevailing price. Bénassy (1987) formally models this situation incorporating a 
labour market and concludes the same. Hence, policies that raise total output and the 
supply of labour (for Bénassy’s case) will also lead to a rise in welfare. 
One means by which this can be achieved is via the increase in aggregate 
demand which results from the government behaving as a consumer and purchasing 
the output of firms. Caraballo and Usabiaga (2006) survey some of this literature. 
The intuitive logic is as follows. An ad hoc increase in government purchases 
potentially raises the output and profits of firms. When the increased profits are 
redistributed as income to consumers, this creates higher demand from consumers 
owing to the higher income. A cycle which is akin to a Keynesian-type of multiplier 
effect thus perpetuates, ultimately giving a welfare improving outcome12.  
Alternatively, an increase in output is also possible if the government subsidises 
production costs as opposed to raising demand. This goes very much in line with the 
empirical observations mentioned earlier. Intuitively, by lowering firms’ production 
costs, each firm will be able to produce a larger quantity or more firms will enter the 
market, raising aggregate supply. Assuming a constant aggregate demand, prices 
have to fall in order for the market equilibrium to be maintained. And this can lead 
to a potentially welfare improving outcome. An early investigation on this comes 
from Negishi (1962). In his analysis, he shows the possibility of welfare gains as a 
result of subsidising new entrants into the market, so long as firms keep to the 
marginal cost pricing rule. Spence (1976b) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) also analyse 
the welfare outcomes of a provision of subsidies to firms and reach similar 
conclusions.  
                                                 
12 This result may not be as clear-cut as we have mentioned here. Heijdra and van der Ploeg (1996) 
show that in the presence of free entry and exit of firms in the economy, the multiplier can be absent 
altogether. 
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Both forms of analysis can also potentially extend to the open economy context 
as illustrated by Matsuyama (1992) and Chandra et al (2002). 
1.5. Closing Comments 
We have established thus far that there is the theoretical possibility that the use of 
industrial policy in the form of subsidies can result in positive welfare gains. A 
preliminary overview of the theoretical literature suggests that this is indeed the case. 
However, evaluation of the empirical literature appears to indicate otherwise.  
This seeming disconnection between theory and empirics provides us with a 
motivation to examine this in further detail. More importantly, there are strong 
indications that subsidies will continue to remain a significant part of government 
policy even if their proven effectiveness are mixed at best. The incentive ‘bidding’ 
packages for FDI documented by Charlton (2003) provides a strong case for this. 
It should be stated here that we are neither advocating nor opposing the use of 
subsidies. What we are interested in examining is what specific outcomes can result 
from the use of this policy instrument, especially to welfare. More importantly, we 
want to determine if a policy rule which maximises welfare exists, before we can 
conclude on the desirability regarding the use of subsidies. 
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Chapter 2  
Optimal Subsidies under Monopolistic Competition 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter develops the benchmark model to illustrate the welfare effects of 
subsidising monopolistically competitive firms. We assume a closed economy and 
treat labour supply as exogenous and examine how different types of subsidies 
impact the level of welfare in the economy. We illustrate how the presence of 
monopolistic competition potentially validates supply-sided policy intervention by a 
benevolent government into the economy. We also derive the optimal subsidy rules 
that maximise welfare. 
Monopolistic competition in the spirit of Chamberlin has provided rich and 
diverse insights both to the economic literature and toward policy analysis. Some 
features of this market structure are that firms produce differentiated products and 
have decreasing average costs, or increasing returns to scale, in production. 
Furthermore, each firm holds some degree of individual market power over its own 
product and, as such, will produce at a level away from the lowest point of their 
average cost curves, similar to a monopoly.  
However, Chamberlin (1950) argues that as a result of a large number of 
differentiated product firms in the market, each firm does not engage in strategic 
behaviour with its rivals, while consumers value diversity in consumption. These are 
key elements of monopolistic competition which imply that there are no efficiency 
issues as those associated with a monopoly1. This is despite firms having production 
                                                 
1 This stands in contrast against Joan Robinson who views monopolistic competition as yielding an 
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patterns similar to a monopoly. Furthermore, social welfare is actually optimised as 
a result of the preference for diversity2. 
Yet, Chamberlin does not actually dismiss the notion that some form of 
government intervention which changes the range and/or quantity of products 
available in the market could possibly be desirable. He concedes this to be valid so 
long as the welfare gain in doing so exceeds that lost from a reduction in variety or 
consumption. This was stated more succinctly by Norman (1989) who lists some 
objectives regarding socially beneficial policy options involving an industry subject 
to increasing returns to scale of production. These include increasing output of the 
industry, inducing new firms into the sector and raising the quantity of varieties 
available for consumption among others. 
Developments in modelling monopolistic competition3 after Chamberlin (1950) 
suggest that welfare is indeed lower under monopolistic competition as compared to 
the benchmark case of perfect competition. Spence (1976a) presents an early attempt 
in quantifying this welfare loss using a series of simulations. His results suggest that 
when firms exercise their monopoly power and diverge from marginal cost pricing, 
social welfare is lower owing to the higher prices it has to pay for consumption and 
the availability of a welfare-suboptimal number of varieties in the market. Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) confirm this sub-optimality and further show that society has an 
under-provision of variety and welfare is lower than in an economy under perfect 
competition. 
To correct for this welfare loss, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) proposed in their 
                                                                                                                                         
inefficient outcome. This non-concurrence was mentioned by Bellante (2004) who reiterates 
Chamberlin’s assertion that monopolistic competition need not be non-Pareto optimal.  
2 Note that Chamberlin’s normative analysis was qualitative in nature. As is now well-known, Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977) have shown by means of a formal model that there is typically an under-provision 
of varieties and welfare is actually sub-optimal.  
3 Some of these ‘developers’ include Kelvin Lancaster, Michael Spence, and Dixit and Stiglitz. Dixit 
(2004) gives a brief overview of the models developed by each. 
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original contribution for all firms to receive a lump sum transfer which equals their 
individual fixed costs. All firms will thus price their output at marginal cost and new 
firms will be induced to enter the economy. Subsequently, social welfare is higher 
such that the economy reaches a first best optimum. Furthering along this line of 
thought, one can posit that if lump sum transfers have a welfare improving effect 
when there are no resource constraints, is there a possibility for the same to happen 
if there are limits to how much firms can receive, i.e. under a resource constraint?    
To the best of our knowledge, this has yet to be studied in detail. Thus, the first 
objective of this chapter is to examine the use of a lump sum subsidy to firms in the 
increasing returns to scale sector when the government is subject to a constraint on 
its budget. Specifically, we are interested in determining if there is indeed an optimal 
lump sum transfer to firms that raises society’s welfare, given the corresponding 
level of tax increases needed to finance it. 
The second pertains to the pricing rule due to monopoly power. If firms hold 
some degree of market power over their product and behave like a monopolist in 
their pricing behaviour, would it be beneficial to subsidise production costs of each 
unit to allow firms to reduce their selling price? Coen (1951) explored this 
qualitatively and suggested that subsidies reducing both marginal and average costs 
and enlarging the scale of production can only benefit society. Taking this as our 
second point of departure, we examine this postulation and examine if there exists 
some optimal subsidy rule which lowers either the marginal or the average cost of 
production of firms in the increasing returns to scale sector. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In the rest of this section, 
we review briefly some of the literature pertaining to the application of monopolistic 
competition in macroeconomics; in particular we shall focus on whether it 
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‘legitimises’ public policy introduction. Section 2.2 lays out the basic Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) model which we will use for analysis. We examine the effects of the 
provision of subsidies and the resulting outcomes to welfare in Section 2.3 while 
Section 2.4 discusses briefly the intuition behind the obtained results. Section 2.5 
concludes the chapter. The graphs referenced are collected in the accompanying 
appendix at the end of the chapter. 
2.1.1. Monopolistic Competition and Macroeconomics 
A lure of monopolistic competition for economic analysis stems from the view that 
it is a better description of the real world as compared to the perfectly competitive 
paradigm which underpinned most of previous analyses. Harrod (1967) credits 
Chamberlin for successfully reconciling textbook pedagogy with observations of the 
real world. With monopolistic competition, Chamberlin had also set a stage for 
future work and research to be built upon. 
One area which benefited from the introduction of monopolistic competition is 
the field of Keynesian economics. As Naish (1993) mentions, an assumption of rigid 
wage levels was conventionally made in Keynesian economics as a reason for the 
inability of markets to adjust and clear in the Walrasian paradigm. While plausible, 
this assumption was often relaxed in later studies due to empirical observations that 
labour supply can even be infinitely elastic in the short-run. This runs contra to the 
effect of rigid wages which imply an inelastic labour supply. Conversely, 
monopolistic competition focuses attention on firms who act as price setters. This 
was perhaps an observation which appeared more consistent with the real world. 
Models of monopolistic competition such as that of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) placed 
focus on the individual actions of each actor in the economy within a general 
equilibrium framework. This provided Keynesian economics with microeconomic 
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grounding. In the words of Mankiw (1992), this meant that “Keynesian economics 
has been reincarnated into a body with firm microeconomic muscle.” 
A comprehensive coverage of what the economic literature now terms as the 
‘New Keynesian macroeconomics’ is out of the purview of this chapter. The 
interested reader is referred instead to Bénassy (1995) who gives an intuitive and 
accessible overview to the micro-foundations and characteristics pertaining to this 
school of models. Alternatively, Silvestre (1993) provides a more detailed and 
thorough coverage of the same topic, but with a different model of monopolistic 
competition from that of Bénassy (1995)4. 
2.1.2. Policy Use in the Presence of Monopolistic Competition 
Monopolistic competition also gives an apparent incentive for the introduction of 
some form of macroeconomic policy to the economy. Taking a cue from Startz 
(1995), resource allocation in the economy is Pareto optimal under perfect 
competition and there is no role for any governmental intervention. Monopolistic 
competition with its sub-optimal welfare outcomes clearly indicates a situation to the 
contrary. Thus, if one assumes there is a benevolent and omniscient government 
seeking to maximise social welfare, public policy which shifts society to a higher 
level of welfare is ‘justifiable’ to undertake. 
Theoretically, Ng (1980) gives an illustration of the effectiveness of policy use 
by examining the outcome of a rise in money supply on the labour market in an 
imperfectly competitive economy 5. Ng (1982) further shows that any change in 
                                                 
4 Macroeconomics was not the only field to benefit from monopolistic competition. International 
trade is another with the evolution of what is now termed as the ‘New Trade Theory’ beginning with 
Krugman (1979) alongside a parallel and effectively identical development by Dixit and Norman 
(1980). 
5  Strictly speaking, monopolistic competition alone does not invalidate money-neutrality. See 
Bénassy (1995) or Heijdra and van der Ploeg (2002) for an exposition. Ng (1980) is mentioned here 
as an example on how the deviation from perfect competition could potentially legitimise policy 
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marginal costs associated with a value added tax will elicit a corresponding response 
in output 6. In an open economy context, Takahashi (2006) finds that unilateral 
subsidies yield welfare gains within a two-country model of trade with differentiated 
goods. Empirical evidence for subsidies such as that offered by Venables and Smith 
(1986) and Yamamura (1986) do suggest they are not uncommonly used. Their 
findings also suggest that there are benefits to be obtained in the macroeconomic 
context, such as in economic growth and the development of infant industries when 
firms are accorded some form of subsidies from the government.  
There is thus reason to believe that subsidy policies can be welfare improving 
when the economy shows monopolistically competitive behaviour. However, as it is 
unlikely that any government has an unlimited budget on which to spend, it would 
be interesting to examine if there is some level of subsidy which yields a Pareto-
improvement before societal welfare begins to regress (if at all), i.e. an optimal 
subsidy rule. 
2.2. The Basic Model 
The model used here is based on the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic 
competition. As mentioned previously, this is the most widely used model within the 
monopolistic competition literature. There are a variety of reasons for this, as 
discussed, but for our purposes, keeping to the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework 
allows our results to have a direct comparability with their original analysis and 
postulations. 
Specifically, we assume an economy with an exogenously endowed labour force, 
                                                                                                                                         
introduction. 
6 An increase in marginal costs raises prices and lowers output and vice versa. Ng (1982) further 
analysed this in the case of imposing a sales tax with similar results. There seems no reason to 
suggest a priori that any form of subsidy to production costs will not yield a set of similar outcomes. 
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L, with two sectors which we name as agriculture and manufacturing. Agriculture 
produces a homogenous commodity under perfectly competitive conditions (whose 
quantity is denoted by A). The manufacturing sector is composed of a range of firms 
producing a variety of differentiated products, the aggregate quantity which we 
denote as Y7. Firms in this sector experience increasing returns to scale in production 
and possess some degree of monopoly power over their own individual product. 
Labour is taken to be homogenous and mobile between the sectors with LA and LY 
denoting the respective labour demands of the homogenous and the differentiated 
sectors. Labour mobility across sectors implies the same unique wage is paid in both 
sectors. Firms have free entry and exit into the economy. This serves to drive all firm 
profits to zero in the long run. 
2.2.1. Consumers 
As labour is homogenous, we can focus on an aggregate representative household 
(which supplies labour) and is assumed to derive utility from consumption of both 
goods. The household’s preferences are described by a Cobb-Douglas type of utility 
function, 
μμ
μμ
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
1
1
AYU ,  (2.1) 
where 10 << μ . Labour is mobile between sectors, and this gives wage equalisation 
across sectors. The budget constraint of this representative household can thus be 
expressed as: 
APYPwL AY += ,  (2.2) 
where w is the economy-wide wage rate, PY is the price index of the manufacturing 
good and PA is the price of the agricultural goods. Thus, consumers allocate their 
                                                 
7 We will use the terms ‘manufacturing’ and ‘differentiated’ interchangeably to mean the same. 
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budget between the two goods, Y and A at the first stage of budgeting. Optimisation 
of Eq. (2.1) subject to the budget constraint in Eq. (2.2) gives the demand functions 
for each type of good,  
,
Y
D
P
wLY μ=   (2.3) 
( ) .1
A
D
P
wLA μ−=   (2.4) 
Total expenditure on each class of good is thus wLYPY μ=  and ( )wLAPA μ−= 1 . 
At the second stage, each consumer allocates his expenditure on each variety 
making up the composite of the differentiated good based on the price of each 
individual variety. Manufactures consist of a continuum of N varieties of imperfect 
substitutes aggregated by a CES sub-utility function, 
1
0
1
−
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
= ∫ σ
σ
σ
σ
diyY
N
i ,  (2.5) 
where 1>σ  is the constant elasticity of substitution between varieties. 
A characteristic of the Dixit-Stiglitz model is that consumption is divided among 
all available varieties with equal weights. Thus, should a subsequent change in the 
number of varieties occur, the expenditure share on each variety will be adjusted 
accordingly and symmetrically taking into account of this change. The consumer’s 
objective therefore, is to maximise his consumption of manufactures subject to his 
expenditure on Y, with expenditure defined as: 
.
0
diypYP
N
iiY ∫=   (2.6) 
Optimising Eq. (2.5) subject to Eq. (2.6) allows us to find the marginal rate of 
substitution between any two varieties and their relative price ratios, which we can 
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use subsequently to derive the corresponding price index of manufactures8, PY, as 
.
1
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= ∫ dipP N iY   (2.7) 
Notice that the price index is dependent on the number of varieties available for 
consumption. Strictly speaking, N is the mass of varieties available, or the extent of 
differentiation in the market, and not a number. However, for an easier intuitive 
grasp, we shall use ‘number’ to mean the same here-on. It can be seen from Eq. (2.7) 
that, ceteris paribus, as N increases, PY falls. With the price index, we can 
subsequently obtain the demand function of a typical variety i as 
.
σμ −
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  (2.8) 
It is also straightforward to derive an expression for the aggregate consumer’s 
indirect utility by substituting the demand functions for each class of good into Eq. 
(2.1), yielding: 
,1 μμ −=
AY PP
wLV   (2.9) 
where the denominator indicates the ‘cost-of-living’ or simply general price index. 
From Eq. (2.9), it is evident that utility is inversely proportional to the cost-of-
living index when the expression of PY is substituted into V. As PY is dependent on 
the number of varieties N, this implies that all else held constant, an individual will 
attain a higher level of utility as N increases. Dixit-Stiglitz models are thus also 
termed as ‘love-of-variety’ models. 
2.2.2. Firms 
On the supply side, firms in the manufacturing sector are profit-maximising entities 
                                                 
8 See Chapter 13 of Heijdra and van der Ploeg (2002) for a derivation of the price index. 
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and each produces a variety available for consumption. Each firm is a sole producer 
of its output and prices it independently of its competitors in accordance to the 
behaviour of a profit-maximising monopolist, taking the industry level price index as 
given. This behaviour is justified by virtue of the fact that the total number of firms 
in the model is assumed to be large. Specifically, the number of firms operating in 
the industry is determined endogenously via free entry and exit into the market up 
till where each firm makes zero profits in equilibrium.  
As firms are assumed to be symmetric9, we can drop the subscript i denoting an 
individual firm for notational convenience. Firms use only labour as the sole factor 
input and each firm faces the following cost function in production, 
YwlTC = ,  (2.10) 
where lY is the total labour demanded by the firm and w, the wage rate paid to labour. 
The objective of each firm is to maximise its profit, 
,Y
D wlpy −=π   (2.11) 
subject to demand, where yD is the total demand for the firm’s product.  
Each firm uses an increasing returns to scale technology for production which 
requires a fixed input of α units of labour for production to take place. An input of β 
units of labour is needed for each unit of output, such that total labour demand per 
firm is 
.ylY βα +=   (2.12) 
Substituting Eq. (2.12) into Eq. (2.10), we can obtain the marginal cost of each unit 
of output or 
.w
y
TCMC β=
∂
∂
=   (2.13) 
                                                 
9 This is akin to the single representative firm modelling framework in Ng (1980, 1982). Aggregate 
output of the manufacturing sector is thus the total output of all firms in the sector or NyY = . 
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Furthermore, it is straightforward to see that each firm experiences a falling average 
cost of production10, giving rise to an incentive for each firm to specialise, with each 
firm producing only one variety of output. This implies that with N varieties 
available for consumption in the market, the total number of firms operating in the 
sector is also N. Maximising each firm’s profit subject to the demand for its own 
variety, the price each firm charges is found to be 
.
1
p wσ β
σ
=
−
  (2.14) 
The expression for p shows that the optimal pricing formula is a constant mark-up of 
1−σ
σ  over the firm’s marginal cost of each unit of output in Eq. (2.13). 
Following Chamberlin’s arguments, monopolistic competition is characterised 
by the presence of a large number of firms in the market. There are no market 
barriers and firms have free entry and exit into the market. Firms will enter the 
market in the presence of positive profits or conversely, exit when they incur losses. 
Free entry and exit thus leads to all profits being competed away up to the point 
where each firm in the market makes zero profits. Thus, using Eq. (2.12) and Eq. 
(2.14) into Eq. (2.11) and imposing the zero-profit condition, we find the 
equilibrium output of each firm as 
( ).1β
σα −
=
Sy   (2.15) 
Eq. (2.15) implies that a firm’s optimal output scale is constant and independent of 
the number of competitors it faces. This standard result stems from the constant 
elasticity of substitution between varieties and from the absence of strategic 
interaction between firms under monopolistic competition. 
                                                 
10 The average cost, which we denote as C, of a unit is ( )
y
wyC βα += . Differentiating with respect to y 
gives 
2y
w
y
C α−
∂
∂
= . Average cost is thus falling with every unit increase in output. 
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With the equilibrium price and quantity defined, we can now find the number of 
firms that exist in equilibrium. Assuming full employment and given the assumed 
symmetry between firms, total labour demand from the increasing returns sector is 
found as 
.YiY NlL =   (2.16) 
Using Eq. (2.12) and Eq. (2.15) into Eq. (2.16), the number of firms, N, sustainable 
by the market is thus found to be: 
.
ασ
YLN =   (2.17) 
Eq. (2.17) has the added implication that the number of firms is dependent on the 
proportion of labour in manufacturing. A change in LY, ceteris paribus, will similarly 
result in a change in the number of firms in this sector.  
The agricultural good is produced and sold under perfect competition. This also 
implies that it is priced at marginal cost. The profit function of a typical firm in this 
sector takes the form  
.A
S
AA wLAP −=π   (2.18) 
Assuming that the production of A is produced under constant returns to scale with a 
unit labour requirement of unity, we rewrite   
;SAL A=   (2.19) 
imposing the zero profit condition, it follows that wPA = . The assumed inter-
sectoral labour mobility gives rise to wage equalisation across sectors with Aw P=  
being also the prevailing wage rate in the manufacturing sector. 
To close the model, the total employment of labour in the two sectors needs to 
equal the economy’s labour endowment, i.e. AY LLL += . 
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2.2.3. Normalisations and General Equilibrium 
With agriculture assumed to be perfectly competitive, it is convenient to use it as the 
numeraire good, and normalise its price to unity: 1=AP .  It therefore follows that 
the wage rate in equilibrium is found to be 1=w . Given the symmetry assumption, 
we can then rewrite Eq. (2.7) as:  
( ) σσ −−= 1 11NpPY , 
which, making use of Eq. (2.14), can be written as  
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−
=
−
1
1
1
σ
σβσNPY .  (2.20) 
Using Eq. (2.20), 1=AP  and 1=w   into Eq. (2.9), the indirect utility function can 
now be written as  
μ
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σ
σβ
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The indirect utility function given by Eq. (2.21) re-illustrates the point we made 
earlier regarding the ‘love-of-variety’ property of Eq. (2.9) in greater clarity. With 
the normalisations, the primary driver of the representative consumer’s utility level 
is now PY, the price level of manufactured goods. As noted, from Eq. (2.20), it can 
be seen that PY is a decreasing function of N, the number of varieties. As N increases, 
the general price index as given in the denominator falls correspondingly, i.e. 
welfare increases as the number of varieties increases: given consumers ‘love 
variety’, other things equal, their utility increases as more varieties are available for 
consumption.  
Using Eq. (2.8), Eq. (2.14), Eq. (2.15) together with Eq. (2.20), we can solve for 
N in terms of all exogenous variables to obtain: ασ
μLN = . The allocation of labour to 
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each sector of the economy can be obtained using Eq. (2.16) together with the labour 
market clearing condition. The resulting labour allocation to the manufacturing and 
the agricultural sectors are found to be LLY μ=  and ( )LLA μ−= 1  respectively. 
2.3. Subsidy Provisions 
The subsidies we consider here consist of two types. The first relates back to the 
postulation in the seminal contribution of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). They suggest 
that in order for a firm to practice marginal costs pricing, the government should 
provide lump sum transfers which covers the losses that will be incurred arising 
from fixed costs. The second corresponds to subsidies which affect unit production 
costs as mentioned by Coen (1951). For this subsidy type, we will examine the 
provision of subsidies which lowers the marginal cost and the average cost of 
production of each unit of output. 
An interesting question to consider first is how the subsidy should be financed. 
Tax theory suggests that if an economy is modelled using a representative individual 
or household, the economy is simply an aggregation of all individuals such that the 
optimal type of tax to impose is a lump sum tax11. In reality, a more common means 
for governments to raise revenue is by levying a tax rate on some portion of income 
instead 12 : Salanie (2003), for example, suggests that revenue obtained from 
proportional income taxation makes up as much as a quarter of total government 
budgets among OECD countries. This particular financing scheme was also adopted 
by Takahashi (2006) in his analysis and we follow suit here13 . 
                                                 
11 See Mankiw et al (2009). 
12 Furthermore, as earnings do differ according to individuals, the tax schedule typically consists of 
different tax rates for different income levels, e.g. in a progressive fashion. 
13 Using a proportional tax system raises questions about distortions to welfare and labour supply. 
Salanie (2003) provides a textbook treatment in Chapter 2. Note that as we assumed an exogenous 
labour supply, the tax does not affect the supply of labour. 
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Assuming therefore, that the government prescribes a value of the subsidy and 
allows the tax rate to vary to balance its budget, what the subsidy does is alter the 
cost and profit functions of the receiving firms in the manufacturing sector. This 
intuitively suggests that the subsidy gives firms supernormal profits in the 
immediate aftermath. In the long run however, free entry and exit into the sector will 
change the number of firms that exist up to where each firm once again makes zero 
profits. 
2.3.1. Demand Effects 
With the imposition of the tax, the demand functions of the representative consumer 
will be affected given the reduction in income. Denoting the tax variable as τ and 
bearing in mind that 1== APw , the budget constraint becomes ( ) AYPL Y +=−τ1 . 
Maximising utility subject to the new budget constraint gives the new demand 
functions for manufactures and the agricultural good respectively as 
( ) ,1
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τ
τμ −
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−
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and 
( )( ) .11 LAD τμτ −−=   (2.23) 
The corresponding indirect utility function is now 
( )
μτ
τ
YP
LV −= 1   (2.24) 
Combining the production function of the A-sector with Eq. (2.23), the new 
labour demand in agriculture can also be obtained to be 
( )( )LLA τμ −−= 11 .  (2.25) 
Recall that total labour endowment in the economy is also the sum of labour demand 
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in both sectors, YA LLL += . For the labour market to clear therefore, labour demand 
in (and its allocation to) the manufacturing sector must satisfy the labour constraint, 
i.e.  
( )( )LLLY τμ −−−= 11   (2.26) 
2.3.2. Lump Sum Transfers 
Practical use of lump sum subsidies is probably most commonly found when 
governments offer a set amount to firms to entice them to set up production in a 
certain location. These can be thought of, for instance, as being in terms of a low-
cost land lease, joint ventures undertaken by the government together with the firm, 
or even simply just a lump sum tax exemption or tax rebate. Its one-off payment 
nature also makes them comparatively easy to implement. 
We assume that each firm receives a subsidy, s, where α≤< s0 14. Denoting 
post-subsidy variables with an s subscript, this augments each firm’s total cost and 
profit functions to 
syTC Sss −+= βα ,  (2.27) 
and 
( ) sypy SsDs ++−= βαπ τ .  (2.28) 
Differentiating the total cost functions will show that under such a subsidy, each 
firm’s marginal cost remains constant at β=MC , with the profit-maximising price 
unchanged as 1−σ
σβ . However, what is affected is each firm’s fixed costs – and hence 
its optimal output scale. The latter is obtained by imposing the zero-profit condition:  
( )( )
β
σα 1−−
=
sySs   (2.29) 
                                                 
14 The case of α=s  is the subsidy in the unconstrained optimum examined by Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977). 
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and is clearly lower than the equilibrium output per firm in the unsubsidised 
equilibrium. The intuition for this is straightforward. As the government subsidises 
firms, their fixed cost fall and hence profits increase. However, increased profits will 
lead to entry of new firms up to the point where normal profits are once again 
reached. In equilibrium, each firm thus becomes smaller, i.e. the optimal output scale 
falls. The market clearing condition for the manufactured goods sector is  
( ) ( )( ) ,11 β
σαμτ σ −−
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
s
P
p
P
L
YY
  (2.30) 
with the homogeneous sector being  
( )( ) .11 SsAL =−− μτ   (2.31) 
The labour market equilibrium is given by  
( )( ) LlNL Ys =+−− μτ 11  
Which, upon substituting for lY and Ssy , is written as 
( )( ) ( )( ) LssNL s =+−+−− σαμτ 11 .  (2.32) 
The first term reflects the labour demand in the agricultural sector, while the second 
is the total labour requirement by firms in the differentiated goods sector. The 
government’s budget constraint is written as 
sNL s=τ .  (2.33) 
Eq. (2.33) says that the total tax revenue must equal the subsidy bill, i.e. the subsidy 
rate multiplied by the number of firms in equilibrium. From the labour market 
equilibrium and government budget constraint, we can analyse the outcomes from 
the subsidy qualitatively. 
Taking s to be exogenous (i.e. assuming that the government fixes it ad hoc), we 
solve Ns in terms of τ and s from the labour market equilibrium condition and the 
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government budget constraint. The corresponding solutions to (2.32) and (2.33) are  
( )( )
( ) ss
LNs +−
−+
=
σα
τμμ 1   
and 
s
LNs
τ
=  
respectively. These two equilibrium conditions are plotted for given values of σ, μ, L 
and α<s  in Figure 2-1 in the N and τ  space15. LME denotes the labour market 
equilibrium while the government budget constraint is labelled GBC. These loci 
show the combinations of N and τ where the labour market is in equilibrium and the 
government budget constraint balances – for any given ad hoc value of subsidy. The 
equilibrium value of Ns and τ  is found where the two curves intersect, i.e. at a point 
such as E. We also examine the result of an increase in the subsidy level. The new 
equilibrium loci are depicted with dotted lines and the new equilibrium points are 
denoted with a prime. 
The intuition behind the slopes of these lines is straightforward. The LME is 
upward sloping because at any point on the line, an increase in the number of firms 
will raise labour demand. The vertical arrows indicate the direction in which N will 
move above and below the LME. The GBC is also upward sloping as an increase in 
the number of firms for any particular level of subsidy will mean the government 
now has a higher subsidy bill. This increased subsidy bill will need to be balanced 
by an increase in taxes. The horizontal arrows show the adjustment paths that τ will 
take above and below the GBC. 
The analysis of the effects of a rise in the level of subsidy can be conducted by 
                                                 
15 Note that the solutions for Ns are not actually linear, but expressing them diagrammatically as 
straight lines makes analysis easier. 
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examining how the two lines shift. Starting from the solid lines in Figure 2-1, 
suppose that the government increases s. This leads to an increase in the number of 
firms which means labour demand in the sector increases, such that the LME shifts 
upwards. The subsidy bill is also now higher such that the government has to raise 
taxes. This results in the GBC moving rightwards. From the arrow configurations 
which indicate the adjustment paths, we can see there is a convergence towards a 
new stable equilibrium with the solutions indicated by E'. 
Therefore, solving for the two endogenous variables, Ns and τ, for any value of s 
that the government chooses, from Eq. (2.32) and Eq. (2.33) gives 
( ) ss
LNs μσα
μ
+−
= ,  (2.34) 
( ) ss
s
μσα
μ
τ
+−
= .  (2.35) 
The solution for Ns as given in Eq. (2.34) validates the initial conclusions obtained 
from Figure 2-1. That is, as s increases from α→0 , the denominator becomes 
smaller and Ns correspondingly increases. Figure 2-2 illustrates the tax-subsidy 
schedule and shows clearly that a higher level of subsidy meets with a greater than 
proportional increase in the corresponding tax rate needed to finance it. Inserting ad 
hoc values of s such that s increases linearly into τ, we find that τ increases at an 
increasing rate. Using α25.0=s , the tax rate is found as σμ
μ
ατ 325.0 += =s . Taking a 
linear increase in s using α5.0=s  and α=s  yield the tax rates of σμ
μ
ατ += =5.0s  and 
1=
=ατ s  respectively. 
An increasing subsidy implies that higher tax revenues are required to finance it. 
This leads to a fall in disposable income and a corresponding reduction in the 
demand for each firm’s product. Thus, to induce more firms to enter, the government 
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has to provide larger lump sum transfers which need to be financed by higher taxes. 
In the polar case where α→s , the tax rate approaches 1, and the consumer actually 
has no disposable income. This clearly questions the feasibility of lump sum 
transfers equalling α.  
While α=s  is a doubtful prospect, the shape of Figure 2-2 also hints at the 
existence of a welfare maximising subsidy rule. To find the optimal policy therefore, 
we have to obtain values of τ and s, such that they maximise society’s indirect utility 
function given by Eq. (2.24). Substituting the relevant expressions for PY, p, Ns and τ 
into Vτ, this becomes 
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Differentiating with respect to s gives 
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
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which we equate to zero and solve for s. This yields the optimal subsidy, or s*, to be  
( )
μσ
μα
−
−
=
∗ 1s ,  (2.38) 
which is simply a fraction of fixed costs, α. Substituting s* into Ns and τ gives the 
new equilibrium number of firms and the tax rate that are consistent with the optimal 
subsidy in the general equilibrium. These are found as 
( )μσα
μ
+−
=
1
* LNs  and  (2.39) 
( )
( )( ) .1
1
μσμσ
μμ
τ
+−−
−
=
∗   (2.40) 
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Note that while the number of varieties has increased post-subsidy, it should be 
remembered that there is also a fall in output per variety as shown from Eq. (2.29). 
The former leads to gains in welfare while the latter works in the opposite direction. 
Since the subsidy level is set to maximise Vτ, we need to confirm that s* does indeed 
yield a Pareto improvement. Differentiating the utility function twice and 
substituting s* for s, we obtain 
( )
( )( ) ( ) .01111
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 (2.41) 
This verifies that the solution does yield a new higher optima and welfare gains are 
indeed a possibility from lump sum transfers to firms at a fraction, μσ
μ
−
−1 , of total 
fixed costs. 
2.3.3. Per Unit Payments 
Per unit subsidies paid towards the costs of each additional unit of output are 
generally done to lower the costs of production of each unit of output, giving the 
firm an incentive to increase production. One form which this subsidy instrument 
can take is a sales rebate by the government to the firm. This and other equivalent 
forms of subsidy provisions are discussed briefly in Yamamura (1986) to which the 
reader is referred to. 
We assume here that the government gives a production subsidy, s, which covers 
a part of the marginal cost, β, of production of every unit of output the firm produces. 
As such, the cost and profit functions are modified as follows: 
S
s
S
ss syyTC −+= βα ,  (2.42) 
( ) SsSsDs syypy ++−= βαπ τ .  (2.43) 
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where β<< s0 16. Differentiating Eq. (2.42) with respect to s, the marginal cost of 
production of each output is now found to be  
sMCs −= β   (2.44) 
and the new profit-maximising price becomes 
( )
1−
−
=
σ
βσ sps .  (2.45) 
Using Eq. (2.45) into Eq. (2.44) and imposing the zero-profit condition, each firm’s 
optimal output is now higher with 
( )
s
ySs
−
−
= β
σα 1   (2.46) 
This runs in tandem with the analysis of Ng (1982). It also hints that there are 
potential welfare gains coming from higher quantities of the manufacturing good 
available for consumption. 
Together with Eq. (2.22), Eq. (2.23) and Eq. (2.26), the equilibrium conditions 
for both types of goods as well as the labour market are defined as 
( )( ) ,11 SsAL =−− μτ   (2.47) 
( ) ( ) ,11
sP
p
P
L
YY −
−
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
β
σαμτ σ   (2.48) 
and 
( )( ) ( ) L
s
sNL s =
−
−
+−− β
σβαμτ 11   (2.49) 
respectively. Unlike the lump sum subsidy, the amount of subsidy which now needs 
to be financed depends on both the number of firms existing in equilibrium and the 
                                                 
16 Unlike the lump sum subsidy case, we restrict the upper bound for s to be less than β. While it is 
theoretically possible for the subsidy to equal the marginal cost of production, following Coen (1951), 
we assume that the government’s motive in providing the subsidy is to raise the production scale of 
the firm. If we allow for β=s , it follows that 0=MC  and we will get ∞=y  which is unrealistic. 
Placing the upper bound limit prevents this outcome. 
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output of each firm. Given that the government pays the subsidy to each unit 
produced, the budget constraint in this case is 
( )
s
sNsyNL s
S
ss
−
−
== β
σα
τ
1     (2.50) 
As before, we use the LME, given by Eq. (2.49), and GBC, given by Eq. (2.50), 
for a preliminary qualitative analysis as well as to check for stability. Taking s as 
exogenous and solving for Ns and τ, these are illustrated in Figure 2-3. The intuition 
behind the lines is identical as before. We similarly examine the effect of an increase 
in the subsidy rate shown by the broken lines. An interesting observation here is that 
while a stable equilibrium exists, the number of firms falls when the subsidy 
increases. This is unlike the lump sum case and also runs counter to our preliminary 
intuition which suggests that subsidies would increase firm numbers instead. Using 
the two equilibrium conditions, we can obtain the solutions for Ns and τ for any ad 
hoc value of s, yielding 
( )
( )( )( )μσμσβα
βμ
−+−
−
=
1s
sLNs   (2.51) 
( )
( )( )μσμσβ
σμ
τ
−+−
−
=
1
1
s
s   (2.52) 
Examining Eq. (2.51), it is easy to see that as β→s , 0→sN . Thus, while a 
subsidy for every unit of output results in a rise in the quantity of each variety 
produced, it also leads to a reduction in the number of varieties available for 
consumption instead.  
The tax rate schedule follows a similar shape to that in Figure 2-2. In this case 
however, with a linear increase in the subsidy of β25.0=s , β5.0=s  and β=s ,  
the corresponding tax rates are ( )( ) σσμ
σμ
βτ 31
1
25.0 +−
−
=
=s , 
( )
( ) σσμ
σμ
βτ +−
−
=
= 1
1
5.0s  and 1==βτ s . The 
values of τ also indicate that our earlier restriction on the subsidy is reasonable, as 
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setting a subsidy level of β=s  simply leaves the consumer with no expenditure 
income.  
To obtain the optimal policy rule, we substitute Eq. (2.51) and Eq. (2.52) into the 
indirect utility function to obtain: 
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Differentiating with respect to s gives 
( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )211
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Setting Eq. (2.54) equal to zero and solving for s, we get 
( )
( ) .1
1
μσμ
μβ
−+
−
=
∗s   (2.55) 
Similar to the lump sum handout case, the optimal subsidy is a fraction of the 
subsidised cost (the variable cost β in this case). In turn, number of firms and tax 
rate that correspond to the optimal subsidy are 
( )( )
( ) ( )( )μσμμσα
μμσμ
−++−
−+−
=
11
121* LNs    (2.56) 
and 
( )( )
( )( )( )μσμσμ
σμμ
τ
+−−+
−−
=
11
11*   (2.57) 
respectively.   
With this subsidy, the optimal number of firms is smaller than that of the 
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unsubsidised equilibrium. This results from the increased output per firm. As each 
firm produces more, demand is constrained by the size of the market, L, and total 
disposable income. The larger equilibrium output per firm then implies that a smaller 
number of firms will be sustained by the market in equilibrium. Given consumers 
love variety and that variety has fallen, we have to verify that this policy rule does 
indeed bring utility to a higher optimum. Therefore, taking the second derivative of 
Vτ and substituting s* for s, we get 
( )( )
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( )( )
( ) .01
1
22
<
+−
−−
μσβ
μμσμσL   (2.58) 
Hence, with both the positive optimal subsidy value and the result that 02
2
<∂
∂
s
Vτ , this 
implies that a welfare improvement is indeed realised. Instead of increased variety, 
the driver in this case is from the resulting increase in consumption per variety that 
stems from the fall of the price of each manufacturing variety. This more than 
compensates for the reduction in available varieties resulting from the lower number 
of firms which exist in the post-subsidy equilibrium. 
2.3.4. Subsidising Average Costs (or Wages) 
We turn now to consider subsidising average costs. As labour is the sole production 
input, this subsidy is in effect a wage subsidy paid to firms for every unit of labour 
employed. With a subsidy of 10 << s , which covers a part of wages, the cost and 
profit functions are now changed to 
( )( ),1 syTC Sss −+= βα   (2.59) 
and 
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( )( )sypy SsDs −+−= 1βαπ τ .  (2.60) 
The marginal cost of each unit’s production then becomes  
( ),1 s
y
TCMC S
s
s
s −=∂
∂
= β   (2.61) 
with the new profit-maximising price set at 
( ) .
1
1
−
−
=
σ
σβ sps   (2.62) 
It is straightforward to verify that this type of subsidy does not alter the 
representative firm’s equilibrium size: Using Eq. (2.62) into Eq. (2.60), imposing the 
zero-profit condition and solving for y gives the optimal output scale, which remains 
as per the unsubsidised equilibrium given by Eq. (2.15). 
Therefore, with demand as given by Eq. (2.22), the market clearing condition of 
a typical variety is  
( ) ( )
β
σαμτ σ 11 −
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
YY P
p
P
L   (2.63) 
with the market clearing for agriculture remaining as Eq. (2.23). The labour market 
is now defined by the equilibrium condition: 
( )( ) .11 LlNL Ys =+−− μτ    
which simplifies to: 
( )( )LNs τμμασ −+= 1 .  (2.64) 
The government budget constraint is given by:   
.slNL Ys=τ   (2.65) 
As the subsidy is paid to firms for each unit of labour employed, substituting for lY 
gives sNL sαστ = . The qualitative analysis of equilibrium and stability is again done 
using the LME and the GBC curves that are depicted in Figure 2-4 together with a 
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subsequent increase in s shown by the dotted lines. Note a caveat here with respect 
to the LME. From Eq. (2.64), the labour market equilibrium solves to give  
( )( )
ασ
τμμ LNs
−+
=
1 ,  (2.66) 
Hence, unlike the lump sum and per unit subsidies case, the LME is now 
independent of the subsidy provided by the government. Any change in the 
equilibrium number of firms now results in a movement along the LME instead of a 
shifting of the locus as in the previous two cases. A general observation that can be 
made from Figure 2-4 is that even though the LME does not shift, the total number 
of firms will be higher with the provision of a higher subsidy level. Thus, while firm 
scale remains unchanged from the unsubsidised equilibrium, the reduction in 
average costs of production resulting from the subsidy will result in new entry of 
firms into the sector.  
As before, taking the subsidy to be fixed ad hoc, we solve for the general 
equilibrium solutions for Ns and τ to give  
( )( )μασ
μ
−−
=
11 s
LNs   (2.67) 
( )μ
μ
τ
−−
=
11 s
s   (2.68) 
A quick examination of Eq. (2.67) confirms the observation regarding firm numbers. 
As 1→s , ∞→sN . The tax rate exhibits the same incremental path given in Figure 
2-2, with μ
μτ += = 325.0s , μ
μτ += = 15.0s  and 11 ==sτ . 
Similar to the previous cases, there ought also to be some level of tax-subsidy 
combination here which maximises welfare. Inserting Eq. (2.67) and Eq. (2.68) into 
Vτ ,we obtain:  
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Differentiating it with respect to s gives: 
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Equating to zero and solving for s to obtain the optimal policy rule, we find 
.1
σ
=
∗s   (2.71) 
The optimal subsidy rule in this case is extremely straightforward when compared 
with the previous cases. The value of the optimal subsidy is simply the inverse of the 
elasticity of substitution between varieties. For example, if we assume an elasticity 
of substitution of 5=σ  between each variety, the subsidy is 20% of the average cost 
of a unit of output. This analysis suggests that the informational requirement of this 
type of policy for the government may be lower than in previous cases as there is no 
requirement for knowledge of either the fixed or the variable cost of production for 
this subsidy to be implemented.  
Substituting for s, the corresponding firm number and tax rate to the subsidy are 
( )μσα
μ
+−
=
1
* LNs   (2.72) 
μσ
μ
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=
∗
1
.  (2.73) 
To confirm that the policy attains a maxima rather than a minimum point, we get: 
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that is, a Pareto improvement is indeed the outcome of this subsidisation policy. 
2.4. Discussion 
The general conclusion we can make thus far is that subsidies to firms exhibiting 
increasing returns to scale do raise social welfare. Apart from the second derivatives 
from Eq. (2.41), Eq. (2.58) and Eq. (2.74) all being 0
*
2
2
<
=
∂
∂
sss
Vτ , an alternative means 
to verify this is by examining the change in Vτ for a very small change in subsidy 
provision. Substituting 0=s  into Eq. (2.37), Eq. (2.54) and Eq. (2.70), it can be 
checked that 0
0
>
=
∂
∂
ss
Vτ  in all cases, indicating there are welfare gains when a 
subsidy is introduced. The existence of a positive tax-subsidy policy rule in all cases 
thus provides some degree of legitimacy for governments in introducing industry-
focused subsidy policies. 
An interesting observation to first make here is on the original postulation of the 
seminal contribution of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). They suggest that a government 
could potentially provide lump sum transfers to firms for them to cover their fixed 
costs. Firms can subsequently price their output at marginal cost, resulting in the 
textbook case of marginal cost pricing as in perfect competition. We find instead that 
such a policy does not yield an optimal outcome. Rather, when firms hold a certain 
degree of monopoly power (as determined by σ), the elimination of fixed costs does 
not yield an optimal welfare outcome. So long as firms exercise their monopoly 
power and price their output at a mark-up over marginal cost, marginal cost pricing 
will only be reached in the limiting case of ∞→σ . However, in such a situation, the 
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economy will comprise solely of the homogeneous sector17. 
The solutions of s* and τ* also make for some interesting commentary. The most 
obvious observation is that the elasticity of substitution between varieties, σ, features 
prominently in all the expressions for s* and τ*. In all cases, as 1→σ , 
manufacturing varieties are more differentiated and this leads to larger tax and 
subsidy values. The converse holds when σ → ∞ . An intuitive way to view this is 
that when σ is small, the additional utility a consumer derives from the consumption 
of an additional variety exceeds by far the utility lost from a reduction in quantity 
consumed of all the other existing varieties. Thus, he is willing to give up more 
disposable income (via an increase in taxation) so long as there are larger numbers 
of varieties subsequently available. The reverse holds with a larger value of σ. 
From the firms’ perspective, the elasticity of substitution between varieties in the 
Y-sector can be interpreted as an indication of the degree of specialisation inherent in 
the production of each firm’s product. Highly differentiated products, as denoted by 
a small value of σ could suggest that firms in essence belong to different industry 
types, where inter-firm production technologies and/or techniques are largely 
incompatible. Hence, there is a need for larger subsidies to induce entry or to 
increase the scale of production in the Y-sector as a whole. Conversely, when σ is 
large, it is akin to considering that firms are all within a similar industry group with 
relatively homogenous products with similar production techniques and technologies. 
A small subsidy is then sufficient to entice firms to either increase output or enter the 
market. 
                                                 
17 When ∞→σ , it follows on that β→p  and 0→s . However, each firm in the differentiated 
sector now incurs a loss of α needed for production to commence and will not meet the zero-profit 
condition. All firms in the differentiated sector will subsequently exit, leaving just the homogeneous 
sector in existence. 
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Also, while a subsidy is indeed welfare improving, it should be noted that the 
mechanism involved differs in the three cases. Recall that consumers love variety as 
reflected by the role the price index, PY, plays in determining utility. PY is dependent 
on the number of varieties, N, and a larger N lowers PY, raising welfare. In the case 
of lump sum transfers, this welfare gain is driven wholly by the increase in N. The 
average cost subsidy achieves this by a combination of an increased N as well as a 
lower p. The production subsidy engineers a reduction in the number of varieties in 
the market. Instead, the reduction in price from the subsidy dominates the loss in 
variety to the extent that PY is reduced sufficiently to still yield an increase in utility. 
The other observation worth mentioning here comes from the solutions in Eq. 
(2.38), Eq. (2.55) and Eq. (2.71). In Eq. (2.38) and Eq. (2.55), it is clear that apart 
from σ, s* also depends on the relevant cost component (respectively α and β) and 
the expenditure share, μ. This is unlike Eq. (2.71) where the optimal subsidy simply 
depends on σ. Whilst it is intuitive as to why α and β enter the optimal subsidy rules, 
the role of μ in s* is less clear. 
We can possibly consider the following. The parameter μ determines the size of 
the Y-sector by virtue of the expenditure share of income, or μΙ. When either α or 
β is subsidised, the subsidy reduces the optimal firm scale but raises N in the former, 
and vice versa in the latter. μ becomes a necessary consideration in determining the 
optimal subsidy as it serves to ‘constrain’ the size of N or y from going to the 
unrealistic ∞=N  and ∞=y . This however, does not occur for the case of the 
average cost subsidy as the subsidy does not affect individual firm scale. Also, in the 
polar case of 1→s , the size of N remains bounded by L18, i.e. there are no possible 
extreme results. The role of the subsidy in this case, is to reduce the monopoly 
                                                 
18 It can be checked from Eq. (2.67) that when 1=s , 
ασ
LN = . 
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power of each individual firm, and bridge the existing wedge between price and 
marginal costs. This depends only on σ. Thus, μ does not enter into the optimal 
subsidy rule19. 
From the indirect utility functions of Eq. (2.36), Eq. (2.53) and Eq. (2.69), it is 
evident that the level of welfare depends on the structural parameters α, β, μ, σ, L 
and s. However, the only variable which differs in each case is s. Substituting the 
respective s* into each indirect utility function, labelling the lump sum, per unit and 
average cost subsidies with the subscripts of LS, PU and AC respectively, we can 
obtain a welfare ranking between the three policy regimes. The indirect utility 
function for the lump sum subsidy becomes: 
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which is obtained by substitution of Eq (2.38) into Eq. (2.36).   
Upon substitution of Eq. (2.55) into Eq. (2.53) yields the level of welfare associated 
with the per unit subsidy, that is: 
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Finally, by substituting Eq. (2.71) into Eq. (2.69) we obtain the indirect utility 
function for the average cost subsidy: 
                                                 
19 It is possible that μ has other roles than just as a constraint. However, that is beyond the objective 
and focus of this chapter and it can be an interesting avenue for future work. 
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It is easy to verify that comparison of these three levels of welfare yields the 
following ranking: 
LSPUAC VVV >> . 
For a government aiming to attain the highest level of social welfare, it is thus clear 
that the average cost subsidy policy would be the one to implement.  
Note however, that this does not imply the superiority of one subsidy over the 
other. As mentioned, all the subsidy regimes yield a Pareto improvement via a 
different transmission mechanism. Our assessment is based on the assumption of a 
benevolent government who uses the level of social welfare as its decision criterion. 
On this alone, the average cost subsidy yields the highest level of utility and is in 
that sense, the ‘ideal’ policy to use. 
2.5. Concluding Comments 
We began this chapter by considering the words of Chamberlin (1950) and Norman 
(1989) regarding the ‘inefficiency’ of monopolistic competition and the aims that 
public policy ought to take under such a market structure. We then focused 
specifically on the postulations of both Coen (1951) as well as those of Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) who suggest for the provision of subsidies to firms as a policy 
instrument to correct for this inherent inefficiency in monopolistic competition. Our 
primary results verify the proposition that subsidies are welfare improving when 
firms experience increasing returns to scale in production and the economy exhibits 
monopolistically competitive behaviour.  
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In this chapter, we considered the use of a tax-subsidy policy combination where 
a welfare-maximising government imposes a proportional tax on income to finance a 
subsidy given to firms in the monopolistically competitive sector. We derive and 
examine the optimal subsidies for three types of subsidies: a lump sum transfer to 
firms, a subsidy for every unit of output produced, and a subsidy to wages. The 
subsequent solutions for the optimal subsidy, s*, show that the welfare-maximising 
subsidy is a proportion of fixed costs, marginal costs and wages respectively. Thus, a 
benevolent government aiming to maximise social welfare appears well-justified to 
implement a similar tax-subsidy policy combination as we have used here.  
A practical relevance of our results suggests that subsidies are viable when used 
for targeting the objectives stated by Norman (1989). Depending on the subsidy 
variant used, subsidies do indeed fulfil the objectives of increasing the number of 
varieties, inducing entry of new firms or firms having higher output levels as a result. 
More importantly, monopolistic competition suggests that the resulting social 
outcome is not Pareto optimal. Introducing policy tools which remove some degree 
of this sub-optimality and allowing society to move to higher welfare levels is 
therefore potentially desirable. On the basis of our findings, subsidies appear a 
potential and viable policy instrument to realise this objective. 
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Appendix 
Figure 2-1: Quasi-Phase Diagram of Equilibrium with a Lump Sum Subsidy 
 
Figure 2-2: Tax-Subsidy Schedule with ad hoc values of s 
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σμ
μτ 3+=  
σμ
μτ +=  
s
τ
1=τ  
α25.0=s α=sα5.0=s
48 
Figure 2-3: Quasi-Phase Diagram of Equilibrium with a Per Unit Subsidy 
 
Figure 2-4: Quasi-Phase Diagram of Equilibrium with an Average Cost Subsidy 
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Chapter 3  
Subsidies and the Effect on Aggregate Activity 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter expands on the analysis in Chapter 2 by incorporating an endogenously 
determined labour supply into the benchmark model and examining how subsidies 
affect welfare and the labour supply. Allowing for labour supply to vary can 
potentially yield insights for policy deliberations, especially in the realm of regional 
and labour market policies. As a starting point of our analysis, we use the model 
presented in the seminal contribution of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) combined 
with some elements of the model in Heijdra et al (1998).  
New Keynesian macroeconomic models incorporating increasing returns to scale 
in production and individual market power of firms are known to give rise to 
outcomes that are inefficient and non-welfare maximising. When product markets 
are referred to as monopolistically competitive, the final good produced by these 
firms are characterised to be an imperfect substitute with the next and each 
individual firm holds a degree of market power for their output. Even in a setting 
where firms have free entry and exit into the market, the market power of each firm 
is not diminished and each continues to act as if it were a monopoly producer of its 
own product. 
Following Spence (1976b) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), social welfare in these 
models is determined by both the quantity and the number of varieties of 
differentiated goods that are available for consumption. Yet, when firms are bound 
to a certain level of fixed costs in production which gives rise to internal increasing 
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returns to scale, free entry and exit of firms subject to a zero-profit condition result 
in the provision of a number of varieties which is less than the first-best outcome1. 
This bears the further implication that aggregate output and welfare in the economy 
will also be lower. Hence, social welfare can be raised from either an increase in 
output or the number of varieties or both. This was subsequently analysed and 
validated by Corchón (1991). 
Apart from welfare considerations, a secondary implication of monopolistic 
competition is that under-utilisation of resources may occur. Assuming labour to be 
the only factor of production under a textbook case of perfect competition, the wage 
paid to a worker equals his marginal product of labour. However, firms sell their 
output at a mark-up over marginal costs under monopolistic competition. This mark-
up implies that a firm’s marginal revenue product is greater than the marginal 
product of labour. Subsequently, this divergence results in an under-utilisation of 
resources, i.e. un- or under-employment, as workers remain paid at their marginal 
product. Bénassy (1993) gives a detailed exposition of this outcome2. 
3.2. Aim and Layout 
If an underutilisation of productive resources exists in the economy, we can 
hypothesise that there may be welfare gains to be realised if the level of economic 
activity can be raised. A higher level of economic activity would, ceteris paribus, 
increase both output and the number of varieties available for consumption, thereby 
raising welfare. Intuitively, if some government policy results in a higher level of 
economic activity, there will result an increase in aggregate output and a reduction in 
                                                 
1 See the analysis by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and the survey by Lancaster (1990). 
2 Matheron (2002) and Matheron and Maury (2004) present some simulation estimates on the welfare 
costs of consumption arising from monopolistically competitive firms via an endogenous growth 
model with both capital and labour. While their focus is different from ours, they do provide a 
quantitative backing to the contention of welfare sub-optimality under monopolistic competition. 
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the amount of idle resources in the economy. Ultimately, social welfare will be 
higher as a whole as a result of the introduction of the policy. 
Thus, the focus of this chapter is on how influencing the level of economic 
activity affects welfare using subsidies3 as the policy instrument. Specifically, we 
want to examine how subsidies affect the level of activity in the economy, together 
with the corresponding effects they generate. We define the level of economic 
activity as the quantity of labour supplied in the economy – which is endogenously 
determined. This is done by allowing a representative individual to choose his 
optimal supply of labour. We shall study the re-allocative effects (if any) that 
emerge from the policy and also derive the optimal policy rule for a welfare-
maximising government. We find that there is indeed an optimal subsidy level which 
results in a Pareto improvement. Also, our other results presented here can 
potentially carry some non-trivial weight and relevance for policy considerations, 
some of which we will briefly address later. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we review 
some of the relevant background literature pertinent to our analysis. Section 3.4 lays 
out the basic model used for the subsequent analysis. Section 3.5 examines the effect 
of three different types of subsidies on welfare and the level of economic activity 
and derives the optimal policy rules. Section 3.6 discusses briefly the policy 
implications the results could offer. Section 3.7 concludes the chapter. The appendix 
at the end contains a mathematical appendix and all the graphs referred to within the 
chapter. 
                                                 
3 We use subsidies in the generic sense rather than referring to any specific form such as R&D or 
preferential tax rates – even though the different types of subsidy discussed below lend themselves to 
different interpretations. 
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3.3. Background Literature 
When imperfect competition is incorporated into macroeconomics, the directions of 
study are not limited to welfare sub-optimality or the possible presence of excess 
resource capacity. However, additional factors and implications such as menu costs 
for instance, are beyond the immediate scope of this chapter and a concise and 
intuitive approach can be obtained from Solow (1998, Chapter 1). 
Most relevant to us here are the seminal contributions of Hart (1982), Rowe 
(1987), and Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) who incorporate market power of firms 
into their analyses4. They come to the following similar set of conclusions on the 
impact of monopolistically competitive firms in the broader economy as a whole. 
Firstly, the level of economic activity is too low in an imperfectly competitive 
market and welfare is suboptimal when compared to the benchmark of perfect 
competition. Secondly, some form of expenditure by the government over and above 
what individual consumers expend can influence the level of aggregate output in the 
economy. This in turn, translates to possible welfare gains5. 
The prospect regarding the possible role of a government in influencing the 
economy has given rise to a burgeoning amount of interest and resulting literature. 
However, it is necessary to first note here that models which examine the effect of 
government expenditure (and fiscal policy, more generally) make up one of the 
existing strands of literature within the framework of New Keynesian 
macroeconomic models. Another group of models are concerned with the analysis of 
                                                 
4 Both Hart (1982) and Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) incorporate some degree of specialisation to 
labour, but Rowe (1987) does not incorporate an explicit labour market into his analysis. 
5 Monopolistic competition often assumes that economic agents do not take into account the effect of 
their actions on others. This could possibly be somewhat unconvincing to some. Weinrich (2007) 
expands on Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) by incorporating the assumption that agents do consider 
their individual impact on others. He finds welfare losses to be even higher than what was calculated 
by Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). This further strengthens the cause for the introduction of some 
type of government policy to correct for this welfare sub-optimality. 
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the impact that monetary policy will bring with respect to output. Our concern and 
focal point of interest here lies with the former and readers who are interested in the 
second can refer to the surveys and references within Rotemberg (1987) and Clarida 
et al (1999) who cover the features of this latter group of models. 
3.3.1. Consumption-related Expenditure 
Starting from the seminal work of Hart (1982) and Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), 
the primary implication of their analyses is to lend support to the plausibility of a 
welfare-maximising government having the means to raise welfare via the use of 
public sector spending. Such expenditure would raise the overall level of activity and 
aggregate output in the economy, with the stimulus for expansion coming via a 
Keynesian-type multiplier effect. This would, in effect, provide a possible rationale 
for governments to use a form of tax-and-spend policy6. Rowe (1987) however, 
finds the actual outcome of public spending to be indeterminate and suggests that it 
would be premature to draw conclusions on how fiscal policy could potentially 
influence the economy as a whole. 
The emphasis of existing analyses in this area has been focused on the degree by 
which government expenditure affects the overall aggregate level of activity in the 
economy. An autonomous increase in government spending triggers an adjustment 
process which results in a more than proportionate increase in output in the economy, 
consistent with a Keynesian-type multiplier effect. Some examples in the literature 
along this strand include Mankiw (1988), Startz (1989), Dixon and Lawler (1996), 
Solow (1998, Chapter 3) and Devereux et al (2000)7. Most of their results appear to 
                                                 
6 To finance the expenditure, the government would have to levy a tax on firms and/or consumers to 
raise funds. This in turn however, would result in distortionary effects which may run counter to any 
potential welfare gains depending on the mode of taxation used. See Auerbach and Hines (2002) who 
provide a comprehensive review of these issues. 
7 For a more substantial review of the theory and of its ramifications, we refer to the surveys by 
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support the hypothesis that increases in government expenditure are welfare 
improving.  
However, this conclusion is far from definite. Dixon and Lawler (1996), in 
particular, caution against any attempt to generalise existing results for policy 
purposes. They point out that many of the results obtained are strongly dependent 
upon particular or specific types of assumptions and/or on the modelling framework 
adopted. In particular, they point out that the presence of a multiplier is very much 
dependent on factors such as whether there is free entry and exit of firms in the 
economy, the time horizon, i.e. short- or long-run, type of government spending or 
even the type of utility function used. Should assumptions concerning one or more 
of these be altered, they can potentially change the overall outcome.  
This lack of robustness was demonstrated by Reinhorn (1998) who derives an 
interestingly counter-intuitive result by extending Mankiw’s (1988) model. Mankiw 
(1988) assumes the government uses debt financing, or that taxes remain unchanged 
following a fiscal expansion. Reinhorn (1998) however, explicitly imposes a 
balanced budget condition for the government and finds instead, that the optimal 
fiscal policy to be one of no government expenditure at all. Furthermore, Heijdra et 
al (1998) find a crowding out effect of government expenditure using distortionary 
taxation together with free entry and exit of firms into the economy. They show that 
when government expenditure increases, there is the possibility of a negative 
multiplier, or simply that a greater amount of public spending results in a contraction 
of national income as a result of increased government spending. 
Hemming et al (2002) review both the theoretical and empirical literature 
concerning the effectiveness and size of fiscal multipliers. Their broad conclusions 
                                                                                                                                         
Bénassy (1993) and Dixon and Rankin (1994). 
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are that the size of the fiscal multiplier can, in theory, be both positive or negative in 
magnitude depending on assumptions such as if Ricardian equivalence holds, or 
whether or not competition exists between public and private consumption. The 
empirical evidence however, suggests that multipliers are generally positive, but 
smaller in magnitude than what might be theorised. Their conclusions simply further 
the level of ambiguity on the actual welfare benefits of government expenditure 
policies. 
3.3.2. Cost-related Expenditure 
As an alternative to direct government spending which affects demand for goods and 
services, fiscal policy can also be used to influence the output of firms, or by 
reallocating productive resources between different agents and sectors in the 
economy. Such policies may possibly (and, in some instances, more appropriately) 
fall under the auspices of the term ‘industrial policy’ where the expenditure is 
targeted towards reducing production-related costs8 rather than towards increasing 
final demand to effect changes in output levels. In discussions of industrial policy 
making and outcomes, such aims have even been explicitly stated, such as for the 
case of Japan (Sato, 1990), and France (Cohen, 2007). 
Empirical case studies for Northern Ireland (Roper and O’Shea, 1991), East 
Germany (Begg and Portes, 1993), Japan (Nolan, 1993), and Finland (Kangasharju, 
2007) seem to suggest that such policy aims can be implemented with potentially 
successful and beneficial outcomes9. Such conclusions lend support to the assertion 
                                                 
8 This can come in the form of cost subsidies, tax incentives and preferential loan treatments. See 
Sato (1990) for a more in-depth review. 
9 The indicators used in these papers as a welfare measurement are, typically, changes in income, 
unemployment and output levels. Barring Nolan (1993), the broad conclusion one seems to see is that 
industrial policies raise income and output and lower unemployment. This could indirectly be implied 
to mean welfare gains. However, Nolan (1993) suggests that while Japan evolved in her industrial 
output and trade towards higher value-added sectors as a result of industrial policy, the supposed 
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that policies targeted at stimulating employment creation and development of 
specific industrial sectors or even simply towards increasing total output are indeed 
effective. More essentially, an underlying implication one might be tempted to draw 
is that government spending in such a manner is socially beneficial, similar to the 
consumption-type of expenditure much of the existing theoretical literature is 
interested in analysing. 
However, the theoretical literature relating to the use and effects of cost-reducing 
subsidy policies appear to be somewhat comparatively less developed. In their 
original analysis, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) bring up the proposition that a 
government provides lump sum subsidies in order that firms can cover their level of 
fixed costs. This will in turn, raise the number of firms (and hence varieties of the 
good) and overall output, thereby increasing social welfare. Developing along this 
thread, Costrell (1990) shows that under monopolistic competition, a subsidy to 
firms’ production costs will always improve welfare, regardless of whether the 
varieties available are too many or too few, as the ultimate purpose of the subsidy is 
to reallocate production inputs to the differentiated goods sector. 
However, rather than subsidising firms directly, Fleurbaey (1998) illustrates the 
prospect of employment subsidies as offering a means to raise the overall level of 
employment, which can increase both the level of economic activity and welfare. 
More recent contributions by Ng and Zhang (2007) and Jodoh (2008) also put 
forward the proposition of using production subsidies as a vehicle to raise the level 
of output, activity and welfare in the economy. The key driver behind this sort of 
effect is that the presence of monopolistic competition does not exhaust the 
productive capacity of the economy. Thus, changing of production costs through the 
                                                                                                                                         
welfare gains from such policy is potentially ambiguous, but not completely absent. 
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use of policy can potentially improve the utilisation of resources, leading to greater 
output and higher welfare levels. 
While it has been established that there are welfare benefits from subsidising 
firms in the increasing returns to scale sector, the seminal contributions briefly 
reviewed thus far in relation to the use of subsidies have focused largely on the use 
of a subsidy to per unit production costs (e.g. Ng and Zhang, 2007, and Johdo, 2008). 
Besides the per unit production subsidy, we further complement the existing 
literature by examining the use of a subsidy targeted to average costs and fixed costs. 
We also add on to the existing literature by attempting to determine if there is some 
policy rule whereby welfare is optimised and study the various effects that subsidy 
policies can elicit in further detail. 
The starting point for our analysis builds on the seminal contribution of 
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). However, our model differs from theirs in that we 
assume that consumers have preferences that express love-of-variety. As a result, as 
in Heijdra et al (1998), the number of varieties available for consumption affects the 
level of welfare. We then allow for free entry and exit of firms into the increasing 
returns to scale sector, with the government using proportional income taxation as its 
subsidy financing instrument. The endogeneity of market structure allows us to 
account for how the policy intervention (i.e. the tax-policy mix) affects welfare via 
changes in the number of varieties, the labour supply, the aggregate output of the 
economy and the labour allocation among sectors10. 
                                                 
10 More ‘conventional’ New Keynesian macroeconomic models such as Mankiw (1988) and Startz 
(1989) normalise the love-of-variety parameter in the utility function to 1. In their analyses, 
consumers care only about absolute consumption. However, as Heijdra et al (1998) have illustrated, 
the preference for variety clearly has an impact on the size of the multiplier and welfare. We thus also 
incorporate love-of-variety into our model. The other main differentiating aspect is in the use of 
proportional income taxation as mentioned. 
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3.4. The Basic Model 
We use a simplified version of the model by Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), where 
the labour market is competitive but labour supply is endogenous. Specifically, all 
consumers are identical, and they derive utility from the consumption of goods – 
with preferences that reflect love-of-variety (LOV) – and leisure11. Therefore, a 
representative consumer has a utility function defined as:  
,
11
11
γμμ
γμμ
+
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
+− LAYU   (3.1) 
where Y is an aggregate basket of a mass of differentiated products, A is a 
homogeneous good, and L is the labour supply of the consumer. The first term of the 
utility function represents the utility from consumption, where μ and ( )μ−1  are the 
consumption shares of each good. The second term reflects the disutility obtained 
from the supply of labour, with 0≥γ  determining the elasticity of labour supply.  
This type of utility function which removes the income effect on leisure is 
commonly used in the literature due to its interesting analytical advantages (mainly 
giving rise to a labour supply function that resembles those used in conventional 
macroeconomic textbook models). As Bénassy (1993) argues, when labour supply is 
elastic, there exists an under-utilisation of labour and consumers change their labour 
supply merely in response to a change in real wage. This utility function simply 
stylises this idea by eliminating the income effect and ruling out a ‘backward 
bending’ labour supply function.12 
Income is derived solely from labour wages in this model and fully expended on 
consumption. The budget constraint can be written as APYPwL AY
S +=  where LS 
                                                 
11 In Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), utility is obtained from goods, real money balances and leisure, 
with money used as the numeraire. 
12 Mankiw (1988) and Startz (1989) use a Cobb-Douglas utility function; for a review of the effect of 
incorporating the income effects of leisure, see Caraballo and Usabiaga (2006). 
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refers to the quantity of labour supplied. 
The consumer faces a two-stage constrained utility maximisation problem. In the 
first stage, the consumer chooses the quantity of labour to supply and the 
consumption of each good given his overall budget constraint. Maximising Eq. (3.1) 
subject to the budget constraint given above yields the labour supply and the demand 
functions of each type of good, that is: 
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Eq. (3.2) indicates that the quantity of labour supplied is an increasing function of 
the real wage.  
Consumer preferences of the differentiated good are defined over a continuum of 
varieties according to a CES aggregator as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), that is:   
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where N is the total mass13 of varieties available for consumption and 1>σ  is the 
elasticity of substitution between varieties. The price index of the differentiated good 
is defined as 
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13 The mass of varieties available is often loosely referred to as the ‘number’ of varieties within the 
academic literature. We follow suit here by taking the two as synonymous. 
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Hence, in the second stage, the consumer maximises the CES sub-utility in Eq. (3.5) 
subject to the total expenditure on this good, given by ( )diypYP iiNY ∫= 0 , to obtain 
the demand for each variety, yi:   
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Substituting the demand functions of YD and AD with the labour supply function 
of Eq. (3.2) into the utility function, we obtain the indirect utility function which 
gives us a measure of aggregate welfare14:  
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It is clear from Eq. (3.8) that utility depends both on the level of real wages and on 
the elasticity of labour supply. 
On the supply side, firms producing manufactures use an increasing returns to 
scale technology with labour as the sole input factor. Firms are symmetric, sharing 
the same technology characterised by a fixed labour requirement of α and a variable 
input, β. The assumption of symmetry between firms allows us to drop the subscript, 
i, used to denote each individual firm. The total labour requirement of a firm then 
takes the form:  
.SY yl βα +=   (3.9) 
It follows that the total cost and profit functions of a typical firm are respectively 
given by: 
( ) ,wyC Sβα +=   (3.10) 
( ) .wypy SD βαπ +−=   (3.11) 
With the Chamberlinian large group assumption, the elasticity of demand for 
                                                 
14 The derivation of Eq. (3.8) is shown in Appendix A. 
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each product is approximated by σ. Maximising profits subject to demand implies 
that each firm’s product is priced at a mark-up over its marginal cost, that is:  
.
1−
=
σ
σβwp   (3.12) 
In equilibrium, free entry and exit of firms into the sector will eliminate supernormal 
profits. Therefore, substituting the price in Eq. (3.12) into the profit function in Eq. 
(3.11) and imposing the zero-profit condition, we obtain the equilibrium output of 
each firm as  
( ) .1β
σα −
=
Sy   (3.13) 
It is clear from Eq. (3.13) that the equilibrium optimal output scale for each firm is 
constant and does not depend on either the size of the market or the number of firms 
in the industry. This result stems from the absence of strategic interaction between 
firms and the constant elasticity of substitution assumption.  
The number of firms that exist in equilibrium can now be obtained using the 
optimal firm scale in Eq. (3.13) together with the demand functions in Eq. (3.7) to 
obtain the market clearing condition for each variety, i.e. SD yy = . This gives  
( ) .1β
σαμσ −
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
Y
S
Y P
wL
P
p   (3.14) 
Substituting p and PY from Eq. (3.12) and Eq. (3.6) into Eq. (3.14), the number of 
firms that exist in equilibrium is found to be15:  
.
ασ
μ SLN =   (3.15) 
which, given Eq. (3.2), can be written as ( )γμμασμ 11−=
AY PP
wN . Unlike the case where 
                                                 
15 Note that as a result of the symmetry assumption, the integral in Eq. (3.6) can be rewritten as N 
multiplied a typical firm’s variable or ( ) σσ −−= 1 11NpPY . 
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labour is inelastically supplied, as in the previous chapter, other things equal, the 
number of firms decreases in γ. Intuitively, ceteris paribus, a larger γ implies that 
labour supply becomes more inelastic, or that consumers value leisure more. Thus 
the quantity of labour supplied by each consumer decreases as γ increases, leading to 
a fall in total labour supply. This will subsequently lead to a, ceteris paribus, fall in 
the number of firms existing in equilibrium. 
Turning to the other sector, the homogeneous good is produced and sold under 
perfectly competitive conditions. This also implies that it is priced at marginal cost. 
We shall use A as the numeraire good. The profit function of a typical firm in the 
homogeneous sector takes the form:  
.AA
S
AA LwAP −=π   (3.16) 
Assuming that the production of A entails a unit labour requirement of one, i.e.:   
,SA AL =   (3.17) 
it follows that AA wP = . Normalising PA to unity implies that that the agricultural 
wage rate is also equal to unity, i.e. 1=Aw . Inter-sectoral labour mobility ensures 
wage equalisation across sectors, hence the wage rate in the manufacturing sector is 
also equal to one, i.e. the economy-wide wage rate will be 1=w .  
Using 1=w  together with LS from Eq. (3.2) into N and evaluating, the number of 
firms in equilibrium is:  
( )
.1
1
1
μσγ
σ
μγ
σβ
σ
ασ
μ −−
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
=N   (3.18) 
The aggregate level of economic activity in the economy can be measured in terms 
of the total quantity of labour employed across both sectors, defined as:  
AY
S LLL += ,  (3.19) 
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with YY NlL =  and 
S
A AL =  being the labour demand of the differentiated and 
homogeneous sectors respectively. 
3.5. Subsidies and the Level of Aggregate Economic Activity 
We now study the effect subsidies have on the economy and the level of aggregate 
employment. We shall examine the use of three types of subsidy – an average cost, a 
lump-sum and a per-unit subsidy – on the level of economic activity and welfare. 
Similar to Heijdra et al (1998), we assume that in all cases the government uses a 
proportional tax rate, τ, on consumers’ income to finance the subsidy. The rationale 
for the use of such a tax is two-fold. Firstly, Heijdra et al (1998) find that under an 
income tax, government expenditure actually reduces aggregate output (and thence 
welfare) due to a crowding out of private consumption; it is therefore of interest to 
see if this outcome also arises when expenditure takes the form of subsidy 
provisions instead. Secondly, the use of such a tax makes our analysis intuitively and 
computationally simple and straightforward16. 
Following the notational convention adopted in Chapter 2, we denote each post-
tax variable with a subscript τ, and similarly, post-subsidy variables are denoted with 
a subscript s to distinguish them from the original set-up. We first redefine the post-
tax budget constraint which is now  
( ) ,1 YPAPwL YAS +=− ττ   (3.20) 
where SLτ  denotes the post-tax labour supply function. 
Maximising utility subject to the new budget constraint in Eq. (3.20) and recalling 
that 1=AP  and 1=w , the labour supply and the demand for goods functions become: 
                                                 
16 While there are different ways of raising tax revenue, income taxes are one of the principal sources 
of government revenue in industrial economies. This gives us another rationale to use it. 
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,1
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( )
Y
S
D
P
LY ττ
μτ−
=
1   (3.22) 
and  
( )( ) .11 SD LA ττ μτ −−=   (3.23) 
The demand for each individual variety will now be:   
( ) .1
σ
τ
τ
μτ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎛
−
=
YY
S
D
P
p
P
Ly   (3.24) 
The indirect utility function is now given by: 
.1
1
1
γ
γ
μτ
τ
γ
γ
+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+
=
YP
V   (3.25) 
The expressions for the demand side of the model are not affected by the subsidy 
type as we are assuming the same form of taxation throughout. However, different 
modes of subsidisation will have a different impact on prices, quantities and firm 
numbers.  
On the production side, we assume that the subsidy is only given to firms in the 
differentiated sector and none is received by the homogeneous sector. Thus, under 
perfectly competitive conditions and with a unit labour requirement of one, the 
market clearing equilibrium for the homogeneous sector is obtained by using Eq. 
(3.23) with Eq. (3.17) to yield:  
( )( ) .11 SsS AL =−− τμτ   (3.26) 
3.5.1. Average-Cost Subsidies 
We now examine each individual subsidy case, beginning with the average-cost 
subsidy. The average-cost subsidy is essentially an employment subsidy such as that 
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mooted in the literature on regional labour market policies17, where a firm receives a 
payment from the government for every unit of labour hired. With the subsidy, each 
firm’s cost and profit functions are now:  
( )( )syC Sss −+= 1βα , 1<s , and  (3.27) 
( )( ),1 sypy SsDs −+−= βαπ τ   (3.28) 
where 1<s  is the subsidy rate. From the cost function in Eq. (3.27), it is straight-
forward to find that the marginal cost of production is now  
( ),1 sMCs −= β   (3.29) 
with the price each firm charges for its output becoming  
( ) .
1
1
−
−
=
σ
σβ sps   (3.30) 
Imposing the zero-profit condition, it is easy to verify that each firm’s output scale is 
unaltered, and remains as in Eq. (3.13). As output per firm remains unchanged as per 
the initial unsubsidised equilibrium, the effect of an average cost subsidy transmits 
through a reduction in the price of the good as seen from Eq. (3.30). 
Combining Eq. (3.13) with the demand for each variety from Eq. (3.24) we 
obtain the market clearing condition for each variety:  
( ) ( ) .11 β
σαμτ στ −
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛− −
YY
S
P
p
P
L   (3.31) 
As there is no subsidy on the homogeneous good’s production, the A-good market 
clearing condition remains as in Eq. (3.26). The labour market equilibrium is now 
given by:  
( )( ) .11 ssS LNL ττ ασμτ =+−−   (3.32) 
                                                 
17 See Kaldor (1970) for example, for a motivation for the use of such region-specific type of policies. 
For a more empirically based review of labour market policies in practice, see Fischer and Nijkamp 
(1988) who compare and evaluate the regional labour market policies in a subset of countries or the 
recommendations by Begg and Portes (1993) with respect to East Germany. 
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The first term reflects the labour demand in the agricultural sector, while the second 
is the total labour requirement by firms in the differentiated goods sector. Finally, 
since firms receive a subsidy for each unit of labour they employ, the government 
budget constraint is: 
sNL s
S αστ τ = ,  (3.33) 
where the left-hand side is the government’s total tax revenue, while right-hand side 
is the total subsidy bill18.  
We assume that the government chooses s, the level of subsidy, and lets the tax 
rate adjust to balance its budget. Using the budget constraint, we obtain the goods 
and labour market conditions in terms of exogenous variables only, and solve for 
values of τ and N. Specifically, upon substitution of the expressions for SLτ , p and PY, 
the labour market equilibrium, Eq. (3.32) and the government budget constraint, Eq. 
(3.33), can be re-written as  
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ασσβ
σ
ττμμ
γ
σ
μ
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s
N
sN
=⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
−−+
−
1
1
1
1
111   
and 
( ) ( )( ) sNsN ss
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⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
−
−
1
1
1
1
11  
respectively. We first examine the existence of a stable equilibrium point, and 
examine qualitatively the effect of a change in subsidy on the equilibrium using the 
two equilibrium conditions stated. Approximating the two equations to straight lines 
and plotting them in the N and τ space, we get Figure 3-1.  
                                                 
18  The government’s budget constraint requires that total revenue meets total expenditure, or 
Ys
S slNL =ττ . Substituting for ylY βα +=  and ( )βσα 1−=y  and simplifying will give Eq. (3.33). 
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The vertical arrows show the movement paths above and below the labour 
market equilibrium locus which we label LME. An increase in the tax rate leads to a 
new point above the locus of the labour market equilibrium. This increase in τ 
reduces the supply of labour19 such that firms who are unable to hire enough labour 
to produce at their optimal scale will incur losses and exit the Y-sector. Hence, N will 
fall until the labour market equilibrium is once again restored. The negative slope of 
the locus is due to the fact that an increase in τ reduces disposable income and the 
supply of labour. The horizontal arrows show the movements above and below the 
government budget constraint which we label GBC. As a result of an exogenous 
change in the number of firms N, the subsidy bill of the government will change 
such that it will have to adjust the tax rate to balance in budget. An increase in N 
increases will raise the government’s subsidy bill, such that it will need to raise τ to 
balance its budget, resulting in the GBC sloping upwards. The horizontal arrow 
paths indicate the movement paths above and below the GBC. 
The intersection, E, of the two lines corresponds to the equilibrium values of Ns 
and τ for a particular ad hoc value of s where both the GBC and LME are in 
equilibrium. From the movement paths of the arrow configurations, we can see that 
there is a stable and unique equilibrium point. Assuming an increase in s as in the 
dotted lines in Figure 3-1, the GBC will shift right to GBC' as the government now 
faces an increased subsidy bill. It must therefore increase the tax rate in order to 
balance its budget. The LME shifts up in response to an increase in labour demand 
from the now larger number of firms to LME'. While the two loci represent all the 
points where the GBC and LME are in equilibrium, the resulting position given by E' 
denotes where the conditions for both are met simultaneously. 
                                                 
19 0<∂
∂
τ
τ
SL  or SLτ  is decreasing in τ. 
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Analytically, taking s as exogenous, we can solve for the ad hoc equilibrium 
solutions for Ns and τ to be:  
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) μσγ
σ
γμ
γμ
μ
ασ
μ
σβ
σ
−−
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
=
+−−
1
1
11 1111 ssNs  (3.34) 
and 
ss
s
μ
μ
τ
+−
=
1
.  (3.35) 
Given that 1>σ , we assume the value of γ is sufficiently large to give the condition 
that ( ) 01 >−− μσγ 20. Examination of Eq. (3.34) shows that Ns increases with s and 
decreases with the elasticity of labour supply, γ1 . A point of further interest to note 
here is that γ does not appear at all in the tax rate in Eq. (3.35), i.e. the level of tax is 
independent of the elasticity of labour, with τ being convex with respect to s – as can 
be seen from Figure 3-2. Intuition may suggest that the labour elasticity, γ, ought to 
feature in Eq. (3.35). However, as can be seen from the government budget 
constraint, Eq. (3.33), in this case τ depends on the ratio of N to L which, given the 
labour market equilibrium, is independent of γ. This result follows since the 
government budget constraint imposes the homogeneity condition in this case. 
The shape of τ implies that the tax rate increases at an increasing rate rather than 
proportionately with an increase in subsidy levels. More importantly, it suggests that 
there is a possible welfare maximising level of tax which the government can levy 
before the benefit of the subsidy is outweighed by the tax burden. The intuition 
behind this simply lies in the interaction of the tax with the consumer’s disposable 
income and thence, the demand for each variety. As the tax increases, the level of 
                                                 
20 It is not impossible for ( )1 0γ σ μ− − <  to hold, but this would imply an almost perfectly elastic 
labour supply (given that 1>σ  and 0 1μ< < ). We rule this case out by assumption.  
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disposal income to the consumer is reduced, and this in turn reduces aggregate 
expenditure across all varieties in the differentiated goods sector. Aggregate demand 
is, in turn, implicitly tied with the number of firms that can exist in equilibrium as 
this determines a firm’s entry-exit decision21. Hence, while a positive tax increases 
welfare, beyond a certain level, an increase in taxes will reduce welfare instead. 
Thus, there may very well be a tax-and-subsidy combination which is welfare 
maximising22. We will return to this later. We first proceed to examine the other 
effects the tax and subsidy combination has on the economy. 
3.5.1.1. Implications 
The ad hoc equilibrium (i.e. not optimal) values for Ns and τ discussed above are 
obtained for any given level of s. We can now further examine the implications of 
these for other variables in the general equilibrium of the model. Firstly, by 
substituting the equilibrium solutions for Ns and τ into the post-tax labour supply 
function in Eq. (3.21) and differentiating with respect to s, we get:  
( )( )
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γ
γ
γμγ
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Eq. (3.36) implies that total labour supply, and therefore the aggregate level of 
economic activity, increases as a result of an increase in the subsidy rate. The 
intuition behind this is simple. From Eq. (3.20), the level of income depends 
positively with the supply of labour and negatively with the tax rate. Starting from a 
                                                 
21 Given that we find the equilibrium output of each firm to remain at pre-subsidy levels after the 
subsidy provision, the market clearing aggregate supply in the differentiated goods sector will be 
reached via an adjustment of the number of firms that exist in equilibrium. 
22 This is akin to a Laffer curve type of effect, where an increase in the tax rate beyond a certain point 
results in utility falling. 
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zero-subsidy, a rise in s will similarly mean an increase in τ which lowers income.  
This in turn, induces an individual to increase his labour supply so as to maximise 
utility 
A second implication of the analysis that is worth pointing out is that the subsidy 
also increases the total number of varieties in general equilibrium. Differentiating Ns 
with respect to s gives:  
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )( )μγγσμ
γμσμ
−−+−−
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The larger number of firms also raises aggregate output in the differentiated sector. 
This higher level of aggregate output together with the larger number of varieties of 
the differentiated good available for consumption suggests that welfare is raised. 
This resulting increase in Ns is also influenced by an increase in the labour supply. 
Recall that in both the unsubsidised, Eq. (3.18), and subsidised, Eq. (3.34), 
expressions for N, the equilibrium number of varieties is dependent upon the labour 
supply. As total labour supply has now increased as can be seen from Eq. (3.36), this 
new increased level of labour supply also supports the larger number of firms now 
present in the differentiated sector. 
There is however, a caveat which needs to be highlighted. It is necessary to 
remember here that utility is derived from consumption of both goods as well as the 
supply of labour. Thus, while the increase in the total number of varieties suggests a 
possible welfare improvement, the increase in labour supply works instead against 
any welfare improvement. Furthermore, labour employment is divided between 
firms in the Y- and A-sectors. If labour supply is constant, i.e. perfectly inelastic, an 
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increase in labour demand in the Y-sector will result in a corresponding decrease in 
the labour employed and in the output produced in the other sector. This will result 
in a further lowering of utility due to the lower consumption of the homogenous 
good. In this case, labour supply is not perfectly inelastic: thus, while total labour 
supply has increased as 0>∂
∂
s
LSτ  and there are a larger number of firms in equilibrium 
( 0>∂
∂
s
Ns )23 in the differentiated sector, it is as yet unclear how the A-sector’s output 
is affected.  
Therefore, we also have to examine the impact the subsidy plays on the outcome 
of labour allocation in the homogeneous sector. Substituting the expressions for Ns 
and τ into the labour market equilibrium condition and simplifying gives the labour 
demand in the A-sector, LA. Differentiating with respect to s, we obtain:  
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where LA refers to the labour demand in the A-sector. Thus, while total labour supply 
is now higher, its total increase is smaller than the increment in labour demand from 
the Y-sector. As a result, as in the case with inelastic labour supply, some labour 
reallocation between sectors has actually taken place. The reduction in the labour 
                                                 
23 As YsY lNL = , an increase in Ns will mean a corresponding increase in LY since lY is a constant at 
ylY βα += . 
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allocation to the A-sector also implies that output, and consumption, of the 
homogenous good is now lower. This will offset to some extent the increase in 
utility stemming from the larger number of varieties of the differentiated goods.  
Thus, we have two effects working against each other, reduced consumption of 
the A-good which lowers utility, and an increase in the number of varieties available 
to the consumer which raises utility. Given too that the supply of labour, which 
reduces utility, has increased as well, the net outcome on welfare is, qualitatively 
speaking, somewhat ambiguous. To determine the actual effect of the tax-subsidy 
combination, we return to the indirect utility function. Using the expressions for Ns 
and τ, we substitute them into Vτ and examine the effect of a small change in subsidy 
has on welfare, i.e. 0=s . Differentiating with respect to s and evaluating at 0=s , 
this yields:  
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This therefore suggests that the implementation of an average-cost subsidy is 
potentially welfare improving. Also, it implies that 0s =  is not a socially optimal 
policy rule and that there exists a socially-optimal tax-subsidy combination that the 
government can implement. 
3.5.1.2. The Optimal Subsidy 
The optimal policy rule can be obtained by setting s
V
∂
∂ τ  to zero, and solving for the 
optimal subsidy, s*, which maximises utility. The value of the optimal subsidy is 
found to be  
1s
σ
∗
= ,   (3.40) 
which is clearly positive. To ensure that the optimal value of the subsidy obtained is 
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a maximum rather than a minimum, differentiating the indirect utility function twice 
and substituting s* into the resulting expression yields: 
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which satisfies the second order condition for welfare maximisation. 
Next, we also obtain the number of firms and tax rate that correspond to the 
optimal subsidy by substituting s* into the expression for Ns in Eq. (3.34), and τ into 
Eq. (3.35). This gives: 
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.  (3.43) 
We find also the optimal value of the subsidy to be independent of all other factors 
and parameters other than the elasticity of substitution between varieties. Thus, the 
value of s* falls as each variety becomes a closer substitute to the next, and vice 
versa. In the polar cases where ∞→σ  or 1→σ , the mark-up over marginal cost 
becomes 11 →−σσ  and ∞→−1σ
σ , with * 0s →  and * 1s →  respectively. 
The rationale behind this is straightforward. As σ increases, varieties become 
closer substitutes to each other and the utility gain that consumers get from the 
introduction of extra varieties falls. Hence, the degree of sub-optimality in the 
production of varieties falls – but so does the optimal value of the optimal subsidy 
(whose aim is to correct the underproduction of varieties).  
Summing up, an average cost subsidy raises the total level of economic activity 
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in the economy as total labour supply increases. It also increases the number of 
varieties of differentiated goods available for consumption while reducing the price 
of each variety in the differentiated good sector. There is however, reallocation of 
labour from the homogeneous to the differentiated goods sector, giving rise to a 
reduction in the output (and consumption) in the homogeneous sector. In spite of this 
fall however, its use is found to be overall welfare improving. 
3.5.2. Lump-Sum Handouts 
We now examine the effect of the use of a lump-sum subsidy, which entails the 
following modification to the cost and profit functions of the typical firm: 
( ) syC Sss −+= βα   (3.44) 
and 
( ) syyp SsDsss ++−= βαπ .  (3.45) 
The solution to the firm’s maximisation problem yields the optimal price rule:  
1−
=
σ
σβ
sp   (3.46) 
Given, Eq. (3.46), imposition of the zero-profit condition gives the following 
optimal output scale:  
( )( )
β
σα 1−−
=
sySs   (3.47) 
Using these together with the post-tax demand equations, we obtain the equilibrium 
conditions as follow. The differentiated goods market clearing now requires: 
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the homogeneous sector equilibrium condition is as in Eq. (3.26):  
( )( ) SsS AL =−− τμτ 11 . 
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The labour market equilibrium condition is given by  
( )( ) ( )( ) SsS LsNL ττ σασμτ =−−+−− 111 .  (3.49) 
Finally, assuming that the government practises a balanced budget rule, the 
government’s budget constraint is defined as  
sNL s
S
=ττ   (3.50) 
where total tax revenue from labour income equals the total value of the subsidy bill 
paid out to firms. We assume the government fixes the subsidy and lets the tax rate 
vary to balance the budget, with N and τ determined endogenously from the 
equilibrium conditions. Using the relevant expressions for SLτ , p and PY, we can 
rewrite the labour market equilibrium condition and the government budget 
constraint as: 
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These can be used to determine the ad hoc (i.e. non-optimal) equilibrium values of 
Ns and τ. As before, we first check for the existence of a stable equilibrium. The 
labour market equilibrium and the government budget constraint are both sketched 
in Figure 3-3, where the locus of each shows all combinations of N and τ where each 
individual condition is satisfied. The intuition behind the slopes of each is 
qualitatively similar to that for the average cost subsidy case. The intersection, E, of 
the loci corresponds to a general equilibrium point. As before, the effect of a change 
in the subsidy level can be examined qualitatively. Starting with a given increase in s, 
the LME and GBC will shift rightwards to LME' and GBC' respectively. The 
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directions of the arrows denote the movement paths above and below each line, and 
we see the result of an increase in N subsequently results in the convergence to a 
new equilibrium point given by E'. 
Solving for the general equilibrium solutions for Ns and τ, these are found to be 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) μσγ
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μ
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σ
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( )μσασ
μ
τ
−−
=
s
s   (3.52) 
The number of firms in equilibrium is increasing in s and γ. The tax rate is, as in the 
case of the average cost subsidy, strictly positive and independent of γ. The value of 
s in this case lies in the range ( )α,0 : thus substituting for α25.0=s , α5.0=s  and 
α=s , the corresponding values of τ are μσ
μ
ατ += = 325.0s , μσ
μ
ατ += =5.0s  and 1==ατ s . 
Using these values, the corresponding shape of the tax-subsidy schedule is similar to 
that illustrated in Figure 3-2. 
3.5.2.1. Related Findings 
From Figure 3-3, we see that the number of firms in the differentiated sector 
increases as a result of the subsidy. This is confirmed when we differentiate Ns with 
respect to s:  
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In the case of the average-cost subsidy, the increase in the number of firms 
corresponded to a higher total labour supply. We examine if the same happens here. 
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Substituting Ns, PY and p into SLτ  and differentiating with respect to s, we get:  
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which implies that the total supply of labour is also higher than the pre-subsidy level. 
Note however, that for this to be the case, the condition μ
μσα
−
−≥ 1s  needs to hold. If the 
ratio of fixed costs to the lump-sum subsidy is μ
μσα
−
−< 1s  instead, labour supply will 
fall as a result. Thus, there is some critical value of α up to which the government 
can increase the subsidy without incurring in a reduction in labour supply. 
As discussed for the case of average cost subsidy, it is not easy to determine a 
priori whether an increase in labour supply results in higher output levels in the 
homogeneous good sector. Substituting for the values of Ns and τ into LA, the change 
in labour supply in the A-sector as a result of the subsidy is found to be 
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Given Eq. (3.17), it is easy to verify that the total output of A has decreased as a 
result. Therefore, a lump sum subsidy also brings about a similar outcome as the 
average cost subsidy by lowering output of the homogeneous sector. This reduction 
in labour in the A-sector also implies that some labour reallocation has taken place. 
Intuitively, the expansion in the number of firms in the differentiated sector leads to 
a correspondingly higher labour demand. This increase overrides the total increase in 
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labour supply, such that some labour reallocation from the A- to the Y-sector takes 
place as a result.  
The total labour demand and the number of firms in the Y-sector are now higher; 
however, we need to determine how the net aggregate output of the sector changes in 
response to the subsidy provision. In the average cost case, output in the Y-sector 
unambiguously expanded, given that the subsidy led to an increase in the number of 
firms without affecting (in comparison to the no-subsidy case) the optimal output 
scale at the firm level. In this case, however, we have an increase in the number of 
firms, but each firm now has a smaller equilibrium output scale relative to the 
unsubsidised equilibrium. Aggregate output in the sector is found as Ssss yNY =  or, 
substituting for Ns and Ssy ,  
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Differentiating with respect to s, we get  
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Recall that we had previously made the assumption that ( ) 01 >−− μσγ : as a result, 
( ) 011 >−−σγ 24  which implies that 0<∂∂ sYs . Therefore, unlike the case of the 
average-cost subsidy, another consequence of the lump-sum subsidy is the 
contraction in the level of output in the differentiated sector. This fall coupled with 
the reduced A-good consumption, renders the welfare effects of the subsidy 
                                                 
24 Recall that μ lies between 0 and 1. Thus, if ( ) 01 >−− μσγ , in the polar case of 1=μ , ( ) 11 −−σγ  
is also greater than 0. 
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somewhat ambiguous25. 
As with the average-cost subsidy, the shape of the tax-subsidy schedule from the 
solution of τ suggests the possible existence of an optimal tax-subsidy combination. 
We first examine the effect of a small change in subsidy. Substituting the values of 
Ns and τ into the indirect utility function and taking the first derivative with respect 
to s and evaluating at 0=s , we obtain:  
( )
( )( )
( )
( )
.0
11
1 1
1
1
0
>⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−−−
−
=
∂
∂ −−
+−
−
=
μσγ
γμ
μ
ασ
σ
σβ
μσγασ
μμγ στ
ss
V  (3.58) 
Eq. (3.58) suggests that: (i) 0=s  is not a welfare maximising policy rule as a small 
deviation from it is welfare improving; (ii) the effect of increase in the number of 
varieties on welfare more than compensates the welfare effect of the fall in the level 
of aggregate output (and consumption) of both the Y- and A-goods. 
3.5.2.2. The Optimal Subsidy 
As with the average cost subsidy, we determine the value of the optimal subsidy by 
setting 0=∂
∂
s
Vτ  and solving for s* to obtain:   
( ) .1
μσ
μα
−
−
=
∗s   (3.59) 
From Eq. (3.59), the size of the optimal subsidy is dependent on the level of fixed 
costs, consumption share, as well as the elasticity of substitution between varieties. 
Furthermore, the portion of fixed costs to be subsidised is a fraction, μσ
μ
−
−1 , of α, 
which clearly, is always positive since 1<μ .  
An observation that is of particular interest here follows from the change in 
                                                 
25 A larger number of varieties of the Y-good are available for consumption and this suggests a 
welfare improvement. However, there is a simultaneous reduction in the quantity consumed of both 
the differentiated as well as the homogeneous good. The reduction in consumption quantity clearly 
works towards an offset of any welfare gain resulting from the variety effect of the policy. 
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labour supply found from Eq. (3.54). We noted that there is a range in the level of 
the lump-sum subsidy which will raise the labour supply before labour supply starts 
to fall. In this case, the value of s* indicates that the optimal subsidy not only 
maximises welfare, it also maximises the labour supply. Substituting s* into Eq. 
(3.54) gives the change in labour supply as 0=∂
∂
s
LSτ . Thus, this implies that the 
optimal subsidy also gives the maximum quantity of labour supply in the economy.  
We can now obtain the tax rate that corresponds to the optimal subsidy, τ*, by 
substituting the expression for s* into τ:   
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( )( )
1
.
1
μ μ
τ
σ μ σ μ
∗
−
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− − +
  (3.60) 
Similarly, the corresponding number of firms in the post-subsidy equilibrium is 
found to be  
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Finally, differentiating s
V
∂
∂ τ  again by s and evaluating at s* gives  
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This ensures the policy rule obtained corresponds to a maximum point, and welfare 
does indeed rise to a higher level with the subsidy. 
3.5.3. Per-Unit (Production) Payments 
We now look at the effect of a subsidy given for each unit of output. The total cost 
and profit function corresponding to this care are respectively given by: 
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( ) sSss syyC −+= βα   (3.63) 
( ) SsSsDss syyyp ++−= βαπ τ .  (3.64) 
Similar to the average cost subsidy case, a per-unit subsidy changes the marginal 
cost of production, and therefore the optimal price rule of the firm as well. These are 
respectively given by:  
sMCs −= β .  (3.65) 
and  
( )
1−
−
=
σ
βσ sps .  (3.66) 
The equilibrium level of output per firm, upon imposing the zero-profit condition, 
increases in this case to  
( )1S
sy s
α σ
β
−
=
−
.  (3.67) 
Unlike the average cost and lump-sum subsidies where the effect of the subsidy to 
the firm is reflected primarily in either the equilibrium price charged or the quantity 
of output produced, the production subsidy works via both the equilibrium price, as 
seen in Eq. (3.66) and the optimum output level, Eq. (3.67). 
The market clearing conditions for the differentiated good requires DSs yy τ= , i.e.: 
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while the homogeneous goods market equilibrium follows from Eq. (3.26) again, or 
( )( ) SsS AL =−− τμτ 11 .   
The labour market equilibrium requires: 
( )( ) ( ) SsS Ls
sNL ττ β
σβαμτ =
−
−
+−− 11   (3.69) 
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in this case. As the subsidy is paid towards every unit of output produced by the 
firms, the government’s budget constraint in this case is given by: 
ss
S syNL =ττ  
( ) .1
s
sNs
−
−
= β
σα   (3.70) 
Using the differentiated goods market equilibrium condition and the government 
budget constraint, the qualitative analysis for the existence of a stable equilibrium is 
shown in Figure 3-4. As in the previous cases, the arrows indicate the movement 
paths above and below each equilibrium condition. Note that unlike the two previous 
cases, when τ increases following a raise in s, the figure suggests that the number of 
firms in equilibrium could fall.  
The underlying rationale for the positive slope of the GBC is identical to the 
previous cases. The underlying intuition for the slope of the differentiated goods 
market equilibrium locus which we label as DGME is similar to the LME in the 
previous two cases. A change in τ results in a change in the level of disposable 
income and subsequently affects demand. Assuming a rise in τ, this brings us to a 
point above the DGME. Firms’ profits will fall and lead to exit from the industry 
until the equilibrium in the differentiated goods market is once again restored. The 
reverse holds for a fall in the tax rate. 
Solving for the general equilibrium values of Ns and τ for a given level of 
subsidy, we obtain:  
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Using ad hoc values of s to obtain the tax rates for β25.0=s , β5.0=s , and β=s , 
the corresponding values of τ are ( )( ) σσμ
σμ
βτ 31
1
25.0 +−
−
=
=s , 
( )
( ) σσμ
σμ
βτ +−
−
=
= 1
1
5.0s  and 1==βτ s  
respectively. The resulting tax-subsidy schedule can again be illustrated to have the 
shape as Figure 3-2. 
3.5.3.1. Comparative Statics 
Figure 3-4 suggests that the number of firms in the differentiated sector could fall as 
a result of the subsidy – which, given consumers love-of-variety, clearly works 
towards a reduction in welfare. To investigate this, we substitute for Ns and τ into Vs 
and differentiate with respect to s. We then evaluate this derivative at 0=s  to obtain:  
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Clearly, despite the possible fall in N, there is still a welfare gain from using the 
subsidy. This confirms the results of both Ng and Zhang (2007) and Johdo (2008) 
that the use of a production subsidy is indeed welfare improving.  
We can verify too that similar to Ng and Zhang (2007), we have a fall in the 
equilibrium number of firms in the differentiated sector26. Differentiating Eq. (3.71) 
with respect to s, we get 
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Aggregate output in the differentiated sector is given by  
                                                 
26 Johdo (2008) reaches a different conclusion. Unlike our case where there is full employment from 
the outset, his initial assumption is that there is an excess of labour supply within the economy. The 
subsidy raises individual firms’ output and induces the new entry of firms. The combination of both 
effects subsequently allows full employment to be reached in the labour market. 
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with the corresponding change in output found to be  
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Thus, while the number of firms is now lower, the increase in output per firm as a 
result of the subsidy in the differentiated sector raises overall aggregate output, i.e. 
there is a larger quantity of each existing variety produced despite the fall in the total 
number of varieties available. 
It is interesting to verify the effects of the subsidy on labour supply by 
substituting for Ns, τ and ps into SLτ  and differentiating with respect to s. This gives 
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Thus, while the individual number of firms demanding labour has decreased, total 
labour supply as increased27 as a result of the tax imposition needed to fund the 
subsidy. 
Finally, from the market clearing condition for the A-sector in Eq. (3.23), we can 
analyse the effects of the subsidy on this sector’s output:  
                                                 
27 Note here that the critical value of variable cost to be subsidised is between 0 and ( )μ
μσμ
−
−+
1
1 . Beyond 
this, labour supply will fall. This is similar to the case of the lump-sum subsidy. 
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Eq. (3.78) indicates that output of the A-good has subsequently fallen. And 
following on from the production function of the A-good, this implies that some 
degree of labour reallocation has taken place between sectors. 
In conclusion, while there is a reduction of the number of varieties of the Y-good, 
total output of the A-good and an increase in the labour supply, there is still a 
positive welfare gain from the implementation of the subsidy as shown by Eq. (3.73). 
We now turn to the determination of the optimal subsidy rule. 
3.5.3.2. The Optimal Subsidy 
By setting the expression for 0=∂
∂
s
Vτ , the optimal subsidy s is found to be: 
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As in the other two cases, it is evident from the above expression that the value of 
the subsidy is positive. Also, it is easy to verify that the value of the optimal subsidy 
corresponds to the level at which labour supply in the economy is at its highest. 
Substituting for s* into τ and Ns, we get the general equilibrium values of the tax 
rate and the number of firms that correspond to the optimal subsidy policy: 
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Finally, to ensure that policy corresponds to a maximum point is the result of the 
policy, the second derivative of the indirect utility function when evaluated at the 
optimal subsidy gives 
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confirming that the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied. 
3.6. Subsidy Comparison and Policy Implications 
We have so far derived the effects of each class of subsidies in Section 3.5 along 
with the optimal policy rules. We now turn to the more practical relevance of our 
results in terms of potential policy implications. Recapitulating, the primary finding 
is that the use of a tax and subsidy policy raises welfare. This is evident from the fact 
that for all 3 subsidy types 0>∂
∂
s
Vτ  holds at the 0=s  point. Thus, our results support 
the view that an active industrial policy can be welfare improving.  
Denoting the average cost, lump sum and per unit subsidies with the subscripts 
AC, LS and PU respectively, we briefly consider some possible policy rationales that 
determine the subsidy choice used. Following Bénassy (1993), suppose that a 
benevolent government wants to increase labour supply in the belief that it raises 
welfare. Assume that all three subsidies are feasible options. We know that all three 
subsidies raise LS, albeit in varying degrees. However, it easy to show that 
evaluating the derivative of the welfare function with respect to the subsidy at 0=s  
yields the following ranking of effects:  
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∂ .  
Thus, the average-cost subsidy would be the preferred policy of a welfare-
maximising government. In this set up, this is equivalent to a wage subsidy.  
A note-worthy point here concerns the specification of our utility function. One 
could question how our results may change if a Cobb-Douglas utility function as in 
Mankiw (1988) and Startz (1989) were used instead. As we had assumed that there 
is excess (un-utilised) labour, we are always on the upward sloping portion of the 
labour supply curve. Thus, allowing for an income effect will not change the 
qualitative nature of our results. However, what may differ is the magnitude of the 
change in labour supply, i.e. the size of s
LS
∂
∂ τ . 
Next, if we assume that the government has full information as to which policy 
creates the greatest welfare gain after implementation, then the preferred subsidy to 
use would again be the average-cost subsidy. Clearly, there may be issues 
concerning the realism of such an assumption. As Buchanan (1959) had argued, 
what constitutes welfare improvements is very often a subjective evaluation 
depending on each individual’s personal criteria. When policy making is subject to 
the outcomes of majority voting, it may not always be the case that the ‘ideal’ policy 
would be implemented. 
From our results, we know there is always a Pareto improvement regardless of 
the subsidy used. However, if the government is not aware of the welfare ordering as 
stated previously, it may be more inclined to simply measure welfare using more 
‘visible’ indicators such as the number of varieties or aggregate output. Thence, it is 
clear that a government who is more concerned with raising the number of varieties 
of the differentiated good will favour the lump-sum and average-cost subsidies over 
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the production subsidy28. Or, if increasing consumption quantity of each available 
variety be the aim, then clearly, the production subsidy is the policy instrument to be 
used. 
As an alternative, we also consider the general equilibrium tax rate (τ*) that 
corresponds to the optimal subsidy as a decision criterion for the policy choice. 
Using this, there is an implicit assumption that the government has complete 
information and is always able to set its tax-subsidy combination at the welfare 
maximising level regardless of which subsidy it chooses. Again using the subscripts 
AC, LS and PU to denote the average cost, lump sum and per-unit subsidies 
respectively, we can rank the optimal tax rates that correspond to each from the 
smallest to the largest. This gives:  
* * *
LS PU ACτ τ τ< < . 
While the tax rate for a lump-sum subsidy is the lowest, so is the corresponding 
welfare gain. 
An interesting point here is how our results relate to those of Fuest and Huber 
(2000), who find empirical evidence to suggest that most governments appear not to 
opt for the use of wage subsidies, despite this being the most welfare-enhancing. 
They postulate this particular preference is due to the presence of union bargaining 
power in heterogeneous firms which raises the costs of a wage subsidy. Yet, taken 
on face value, it may simply be due to the lower tax rate which could make such a 
policy more appealing29. 
                                                 
28 Recall that 0>∂
∂
s
Ns  for both the average cost and the lump sum subsidies, but 0<∂
∂
s
Ns  for the per 
unit case. 
29 The reasoning behind this falls under public choice theory and is out of the purview of this chapter. 
As an initial exploration however, consider the tax rate as the ‘price’ an electorate has to pay for 
voting a government to power. Thus, a government seeking to maximise both votes and welfare could 
plausibly opt for the policy with the lowest tax instead, so as to increase its chances of being in power. 
In our analysis, this falls on the lump sum subsidy and tax combination. For a more complete analysis, 
see Winer and Hettich (2004). 
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3.7. Closing Comments 
The New Keynesian macroeconomic literature holds that fiscal policy in the form of 
the government acting as a consumer is a useful policy tool for raising social welfare. 
In this chapter, we have examined and illustrated the prospects for the use of 
subsidies to the differentiated goods sector of the economy financed by a 
proportional income tax. While the proportional income tax such as the one we used 
in this chapter potentially reduces utility due its effecting an increase in labour 
supply, a reduction in nominal income and a decline in output of the homogeneous 
good sector, we find that the resulting expansion of the differentiated goods sector in 
the form of a greater number of varieties for consumption or in an increased 
individual firm output increases utility such that a net gain in welfare is the final 
outcome.  
A key take-away one can obtain from this chapter is that the type of subsidy 
policy we considered does not appear to yield negative welfare outcomes that have 
been identified as resulting from the more ‘conventional’ government consumption 
type of expenditure policy – typically due to crowding-out effects of private 
consumption. Thus, our results in this chapter complement the existing literature by 
showing that there is a possible second avenue via which welfare beneficial fiscal 
policy can be enacted. Instead of the more ‘conventional’ government consumption 
type of expenditure policy, a supply side tax-and-subsidy policy also appears to hold 
worthwhile promise to a welfare-maximising government as an alternative means to 
raise social welfare. 
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Appendix 
A. Mathematical Derivations 
A1. Deriving the Indirect Utility Function 
Maximising the utility function, 
,
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subject to the budget constraint, we get the labour supply function as a function of 
the general price index, or  
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Substituting the expressions for YD and AD into U, we obtain an expression for the 
indirect utility function which we denote as V: 
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L is the labour supplied by the representative consumer. Thus replacing L with LS 
and substituting the expression for the labour supply function into V, we get 
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which as mentioned in Section 3.4, is a function of real wage and the elasticity of 
labour supply. 
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B. Graphs 
Figure 3-1: Equilibrium with the use of an Average Cost Subsidy 
 
Figure 3-2: Tax-Subsidy Schedule with ad hoc values of s 
 
 
τ 
μ
μτ += 3  
μ
μτ += 1  
τ
1=τ  
25.0=s  1=s5.0=s  
s
N 
τ 
GBC
GBC' 
LME' 
LME 
E'
E
Dotted lines show the effect of an increase in subsidy on N and τ. 
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Figure 3-3: Equilibrium with the use of a Lump Sum Subsidy 
 
Figure 3-4: Equilibrium with the use of a Per Unit Subsidy 
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Dotted lines illustrate the effect of an increase in subsidy on N and τ. 
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Chapter 4  
Optimal Subsidies and Welfare in a Small Open Economy 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter extends the benchmark model developed in Chapter 2 by including an 
external sector to the model. We treat labour supply as exogenous and examine the 
effects of a subsidy provision to firms in a small open economy. Much of the 
existing literature that analyses the welfare desirability of subsidy provisions, 
typically within the New Trade Theory context, has yielded ambiguous results. We 
show that this is not necessarily the case within a monopolistically competitive 
framework and that the use of a subsidy to average costs always leads to a Pareto 
improvement. 
Incorporating imperfect competition into macroeconomics has yielded a 
bountiful harvest of insights on the desirability of government in the macro-
economy. Such beneficial results are not just limited to the closed economy context, 
but also extend to the open-economy context 1 . Central to this theme is the 
assumption that firms experience increasing returns to scale in production and there 
are potential welfare gains to be garnered when a government uses fiscal 
expenditure to influence either demand or aggregate output. Matsuyama (1995) 
reviews and covers the theoretical underpinnings and related literature pertaining to 
this. 
Assuming therefore, that firms have decreasing average costs of production, 
                                                 
1 The New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature also utilises a similar framework, but the 
emphasis is on monetary and exchange rate policy issues. As in our previous chapters, our focus in 
here is on fiscal policy.  See Corsetti (2007) for an overview of the former strand of the literature. 
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welfare improvements can be obtained if a benevolent and welfare-maximising 
government were to implement policies that raise demand for the firms’ output. 
Defining fiscal policy broadly as any set of government tax or revenue-generating or 
expenditure policy, the strategic trade literature offers a rich area where this is 
examined in the open economy. The seminal contribution of Brander and Spencer 
(1985) is one such example. They illustrated how by providing a subsidy to an 
exporting firm, a government creates a rent shifting effect, or – more specifically – a 
result where profits from foreign firms are ‘transferred’ to domestic firms. 
Subsequently, output of the home firm is raised and there is a larger domestic 
industrial sector analogously speaking. The extra profits accruing to the country as a 
result of the subsidy policy more than offset the government subsidy bill, thus 
ensuing in an increase in welfare2. 
 This welfare gain is not necessarily confined only to the policy-implementing 
country. As Mai and Hwang (1987) have shown, when a domestic government 
implements an export subsidy, welfare-improvements for the other country are also 
possible, so long as the country that implements the policy has either a larger 
international market share (in the case of a single exporting firm), or a larger number 
of domestic exporting firms relative to the foreign country. These results bring with 
them several suggestive implications. Firstly, if export subsidies and increased 
exports are socially beneficial, they ought to be used. And secondly, these results 
suggest (and this is supported by some empirical evidence) that higher export levels 
may result in greater economic growth (Greenaway and Kneller, 2005). Thus, there 
appears to be justification for export subsidies to be disbursed to firms. 
However, an issue with the use of export subsidies relates to the robustness of 
                                                 
2 Hamilton and Stiegert (2002) provide empirical evidence suggesting that this is an empirically valid 
result. 
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the findings. Brander and Spencer (1985) had used Cournot competition for their 
analysis. Under Bertrand competition, as Eaton and Grossman (1986) show, the 
optimal policy entails the use of a tax on exports as opposed to a subsidy! Markusen 
and Venables (1988) further highlight and illustrate this. Using a two-country model 
and considering a variety of settings, they find that the case for a policy intervention 
is not robust to varying assumptions concerning entry and market segmentation. For 
example, with free entry and exit of firms into each economy any policy intervention 
will reduce welfare – i.e. the socially optimal policy to pursue is free trade. However, 
if the number of firms is fixed no entry of firms is possible in each economy, an 
import tariff or export subsidy can be welfare improving. Similarly, the policy 
effects are greater when markets are segmented, e.g. due to trade frictions.  
Despite the inconclusiveness of the economic literature, real world observations 
do seem to suggest that subsidies are provided in a more covert manner. While 
multinational international agreements tend to restrict governments from providing 
explicit export subsidies, support can, and is, provided in other ways3. Government 
expenditure in other forms of industry support such as government-backed finance 
schemes for firms, transport and infrastructure development, tax holidays, etc, that 
are actually permissible and may come under the generic term of ‘industrial policy’. 
Ishi (1999) for example, documents the industrial policy practices in Japan in the 
form of import restrictions, export promotion and government directives on resource 
allocation 4. Apart from Japan, Cohen (2007) also provides a detailed historical 
overview of various industry-enhancing policies used by the French government. 
These are designed such that they protect and aid the growth of a number of specific 
industrial sectors against foreign competitors, thereby enhancing their development 
                                                 
3 See the examples and references listed in Greenaway and Kneller (2005). 
4 Noland (1993) had previously examined the impact quantitatively and finds the use of such to be 
welfare improving. 
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and growth prospects. 
4.1.1. Objective and Layout 
While the exposition by Matsuyama (1995) outlines the theoretical underpinnings of 
the rationale for the use of government expenditure to raise aggregate demand and 
show how this can be welfare improving in the open-economy, Greenaway and 
Kneller (2005) hint that governments appear to also favour support policies for 
industries that influence aggregate supply. Such policies may take the form of 
export-competition, import-substitution or both. The outcome of using widespread 
domestic subsidies to support and influence local industrial output and growth in an 
open economy is perhaps somewhat more ambiguous. 
Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to examine what possible outcomes 
arise if governments give economy-wide support to firms. We choose a 
monopolistically competitive market structure on which to build our model, with 
free entry and exit of firms into the market with little or no strategic interaction 
between them. We analyse the use of an average cost subsidy, which is in effect a 
wage subsidy. The welfare rankings of subsidy policies obtained from both Chapter 
2 and Chapter 3 have shown clearly that this particular subsidy is welfare superior to 
either a per unit production subsidy or a subsidy to fixed costs. Hence, we take the 
government to be one who goes for the highest level of welfare and will therefore 
implement this policy. 
Thus, this chapter tries to address the following specific questions. In an open 
economy with monopolistically competitive firms, does the provision of a subsidy 
yield a robust welfare improving outcome as in the case of the closed economy? 
Does a welfare maximising subsidy policy exist? What other possible effects are 
there in implementing support policies, or subsidies as we assume them to be, to 
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firms within this market structure, e.g. on output and on the pattern of trade? 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the relevant 
related literature on the use of fiscal policy (in the broad sense as we categorised it 
earlier) in the open economy. We then lay out the basic model on which our 
subsequent analysis is built in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 proceeds to examine the 
outcomes of an average-cost subsidy policy implemented by the domestic 
government. We also spell out the rationale for this particular subsidy choice in this 
section. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter. A mathematical appendix contains the 
derivation of the model calibration followed by a listing of the graphs and some 
numerical results obtained from the analysis in Section 4.4. 
4.2. Related Literature 
4.2.1. Trade Instruments 
There are several lines of analysis within the monopolistic competition literature 
concerned with how fiscal policy in the open economy potentially affects welfare. 
One of these involves influencing the demand for firms’ output and studying the 
resulting welfare change. 
One type of policy intervention, as explored by Venables (1982) and Lancaster 
(1991), consists of the imposition of tariffs on the imports of the differentiated good. 
These authors show that when imports are subject to a tariff, an expansion of the 
domestic differentiated good sector can result and give a welfare outcome that is 
superior to free trade. Venables (1982) and Lancaster (1991) had utilised a small 
open economy setting, where the domestic economy exports a homogeneous 
commodity and imports differentiated varieties. Hence, the tariff raises the price of 
imports such that it diverts domestic consumption away from differentiated imports 
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in favour of domestic varieties. This subsequently induces the entry of new firms to 
the differentiated sector, thereby raising welfare. Jørgensen and Schröder (2005) 
however, study the use of tariff policies with a subsequent redistribution of the tariff 
revenue to consumers in a two-country scenario where only differentiated goods in a 
monopolistically competitive market structure are produced and traded. Using a 
specific tariff on the price of imports and an ad valorem tariff, they find that any 
tariff policy always yields a welfare outcome inferior to free trade, even with the 
tariff revenue being redistributed fully. In both tariff regimes, the tariff diverts 
domestic consumption away from importing varieties, leading to a reduction in the 
aggregate level of imports due either to a reduction in output of each exporting firm, 
or in the number of firms (varieties) traded. Hence, owing to consumers’ love for 
variety, the resulting fewer number of varieties available for consumption causes 
social welfare to fall as compared to free trade5. 
An alternative instrument to the imposition of a tariff is the provision of export 
subsidies to firms in a monopolistically competitive market structure. Extending the 
Brander and Spencer (1985) analysis to monopolistic competition, Lin (1996) finds 
that consumers enjoy higher welfare levels as a result of a subsidy, as they end up 
with a greater aggregate level of consumption of the differentiated good. When both 
governments provide an export subsidy, prices of the differentiated imported 
varieties are lower in the respective importing countries. This diverts consumption 
away from the homogeneous good to the differentiated one. The higher demand for 
differentiated imports subsequently fuels an increase in the total number of 
differentiated varieties produced in both countries, generating a higher level of 
                                                 
5 This possible conflict of outcomes is also illustrated by Sen (2005) who considers the scenarios of 
having either the differentiated or homogeneous sector to be non-traded. In the former, welfare is 
raised as tariffs induce the entry of firms into the sector. In the latter, import tariffs result in an exit of 
firms from the differentiated sector and leading to a welfare decline. 
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welfare to consumers with love-of-variety preferences. 
4.2.2. Government Domestic Expenditure 
The government’s domestic expenditure can be used to influence demand or supply 
of output. In the former, the government can take on the role of a consumer and use 
its expenditure to raise aggregate demand of the economy, and expanding the 
increasing returns sector as a consequence. Examples of analysis along this line 
include those studied by Santoni (1999) and Andersen (2007). The focus of our 
interest here is in the latter, where government expenditure is used to influence costs 
and the level of output. 
Of particular relevance to us here are the contributions of Flam and Helpman 
(1987) and Venables (1987), who examine the various effects of firm subsidies 
using monopolistic competition as the market structure. Flam and Helpman (1987) 
consider the case of a small open economy where a government utilises several 
different types of subsidy and tariff instruments. They find that welfare is raised 
from an increase in product variety when an import tariff is used, but varying 
subsidy tools appear to give no conclusive outcome on welfare. Within a two 
country context however, Venables (1987) finds that in the presence of individual 
firm market power, an import tariff or some form of cost subsidy always gives rise 
to higher welfare. 
Along a similar vein, Bettendorf and Heijdra (2004) examine the impact of a 
production subsidy using an overlapping-generations model. They identify the 
possibility of a first-best outcome when a government adopts an import tariff and 
production subsidy policy combination, both instruments which were already found 
to give socially beneficial results individually. Their results go towards resolving the 
ambiguity of outcomes found by Flam and Helpman (1987), while lending support 
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to the positive results obtained by Venables (1987). 
The general implication one might get thus far is that government expenditure in 
the form of subsidies can have a positive effect on welfare6. Thus, with this in mind, 
we extend the existing literature by attempting to establish if there is an optimum 
subsidy for a small open economy that engages in trade of differentiated final goods 
with the rest of the world. We also study what outcomes arise from a widespread 
subsidy provision to firms in the increasing returns to scale sector. These include 
among others, the effects of the subsidy on firm output scale, the size of the sector 
and the pattern of trade. 
The seminal contribution of Flam and Helpman (1987), which we use as the 
basis for our model, had assumed the differentiated sector of the domestic economy 
to be ‘large’, that the number of varieties produced domestically has an effect on the 
foreign price index of Y, thereby influencing real foreign expenditure. In contrast to 
them, we take the open economy to be ‘small’, such that both domestic price and the 
number of varieties produced have no effect on real expenditure of the rest of the 
world. As we will show in the next section, foreign demand and expenditure of the 
differentiated good is influenced only by price and the elasticity of substitution 
between each variety. The small open economy setting is interesting in that – as 
some have argued – globalisation means that each individual economy becomes 
smaller relative to the world as a whole. Furthermore, it is certainly the case that 
many newly industrialising economies that pursued trade liberalisation policies in 
recent decades are relatively small. 
                                                 
6 However, as a word of caution, Francois (1992) finds that if the small open economy engages in 
trade in differentiated intermediates, subsidies do not yield any welfare gains and the optimal policy 
to adopt remains a non-interventionist one. 
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4.3. The Model 
The base model employed here for our analysis follows from the specification spelt 
out in Flam and Helpman (1987). We take the case of a small open economy 
endowed with a labour force, L, which engages in trade with the rest of the world. 
Both the domestic economy and the rest of the world produce a homogeneous good, 
(A), and a differentiated commodity, (Y). To differentiate between them, the 
subscript F is added to denote foreign variables. 
Specifically, all consumers are identical and consume both goods. A 
representative individual has the following Cobb-Douglas utility function,  
1
1
Y AU
μ μ
μ μ
−⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
= ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
−⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ .  (4.1) 
Income (I) is derived solely from the supply of labour, or I wL= . This is then fully 
expended on consumption, implying the budget constraint, A YI P A P Y= + . 
Y is a composite basket of goods following the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) 
formulation, made up of a continuum of domestic varieties, yi, and imports, 
Fi
x , 
where i is a specific variety from within the range  [0, N], with the corresponding 
foreign range [0, NF]7. With trade, the composite basket Y takes the form:  
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The corresponding price index can be found as:  
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The individual’s utility maximisation problem takes place in two stages. In the 
                                                 
7 Note that while we have a continuum of domestic, N, and foreign, NF, varieties, we will consider 
them as the ‘number’ of varieties available. Strictly speaking, this is incorrect, but it facilitates ease of 
intuitive understanding in the later stages. 
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first stage, maximising Eq. (4.1) with respect to the budget constraint yields the 
expenditure on each good, or  
YI P Yμ =   (4.4) 
( )1 AI P Aμ− =   (4.5) 
The second stage consists of allocating the expenditure share on Y, or Eq. (4.4), to 
each variety given the price index, PY, from Eq. (4.3). With each variety entering 
into the consumption function symmetrically, this gives the home demand function 
of each domestic i-th variety as:  
D i
i
Y Y
pIy
P P
σμ −⎛ ⎞
= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  (4.6) 
and demand for each foreign variety: 
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Given the assumption of a small open economy, domestic exports have no influence 
on the rest of the world. Therefore, trade flows from/to this small open economy do 
not affect the price and the number of the varieties produced in the rest of the world, 
or the world price index, 
FY
P . Assuming the elasticity of substitution between 
domestic exports to equal that between foreign varieties, the foreign demand 
function can be written as in Eq. (4.7). Since 
FY
P  is exogenous, foreign demand of 
domestic varieties y is determined solely by pi. Thus, denoting foreign expenditure 
with EF (which is treated as exogenous), we can write the foreign demand function 
for domestically produced varieties without any loss of generality as: 
.σ−= iF
FD
i pEy   (4.8) 
Finally, the domestic economy’s indirect utility function is derived to be:  
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1
Y A
wLV
P Pμ μ−
= .  (4.9) 
On the supply side, the homogeneous good is produced and traded under 
constant returns to scale with a unit labour requirement of unity. This implies a 
production function of the form:  
A
S LA = .  (4.10) 
Firms in this sector pay a wage, w, to labour and in a perfectly competitive market 
with constant returns to scale, the profit function can be written as 
A
S
AA wLAP −=π ,   (4.11) 
where the first term is the revenue a typical firm receives and the second term is its 
production costs. 
For the differentiated sector, a typical firm uses labour as the only production 
input. In equilibrium, each firm’s total output will equal the sum of home and 
foreign demand, or:  
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A fixed input of α is incurred in production with a marginal requirement of β for 
each unit of y such that the total labour demand by a typical firm i is: 
i il yα β= +    
The cost function of the firm is given as:  
( )Si iC y wα β= + ,  (4.13) 
with a corresponding profit function of: 
( ) ( )wyyyp SiFDiDiii βαπ +−+= .  (4.14) 
The firm maximises its profit subject to demand, and sells its output at a mark-up 
over its marginal cost of production, with price: 
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Substituting for pi into the profit function, the optimal scale each firm operates at is 
found to be:  
( ) ( ) .1β
σα −
=+= FDi
D
i
S
i yyy   (4.16) 
With symmetry between firms, the subscript i denoting each firm can be dropped. 
4.3.1. Normalisations and General Equilibrium 
The homogeneous good is assumed to be produced under perfectly competitive 
conditions with a unit labour requirement of one and freely traded.  Using this good 
as the numeraire implies:  
1=AP ,  (4.17) 
from which follows that the wage rate is 1w =  in the A sector. With inter-sectoral 
labour mobility then results in wage equalisation between sectors, i.e. the wage in 
the Y-sector is thus also 1. Substituting 1AP w= =  into Eq. (4.9), the indirect utility 
function can now be written as:   
Y
LV
Pμ
=   (4.18) 
As we have imposed a symmetric equilibrium, Eq. (4.3) can be written as 
( ) σσσ −−− += 1 111 FFY pNNpP .  
Thence, substituting Eq. (4.3) and Eq. (4.15) into the good market equilibrium 
condition for each variety in Eq. (4.12) and solving for N, we obtain the number of 
firms that exist in equilibrium:   
( )( )
( ) σ
σ σβ
σ
σσβασ
μ −
− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
−
−−
=
1
1
1
1
F
F
F
pN
E
LN . (4.19) 
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The total labour requirement for the Y-sector is thus derived as  
NlLY =  
( )( )
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
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⎛ −
−
−−
=
−
−
σ
σ σβ
σ
σσβασ
μ
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1
1
F
F
F
pN
E
L . (4.20) 
Domestic labour allocation and supply of the homogenous sector is therefore: 
NlLLA −=    
( )( )
( )
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σ σβ
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E
LL   
SA= . (4.21) 
Thence, the market clearing condition for the homogenous goods market implies 
that total imports of the A-good equals the difference between total expenditure and 
domestic supply, giving: 
M D SA A A= −    
( ) σ
σ
σ
σβ
σ
ασ
σ
σβ
ασ
σ
σβμ
−
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−
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−
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⎛
−
=
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1
1
1
1
1 F
F
F
F pN
E
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. (4.22) 
It is straightforward to verify too, that the trade balance condition holds, i.e.:   
( ) 0=−+ FDDFFFM NpyxpNA .  (4.23) 
The first term in Eq. (4.23) follows on from Eq. (4.22), which is the amount of the 
A-good imported8 needed for the homogenous good market to clear. The first and 
second terms in parenthesis give the total value of the differentiated imports which 
are consumed domestically and that of the exported domestic varieties respectively. 
Thus, Eq. (4.23) equates the sum of the excess demands in both markets and ensures 
that both the A- and Y-good markets clear.  
                                                 
8 The domestic economy can also be a net exporter of A, in which case AM will be negative. 
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From the trade balance condition, a trade ratio (r), of the differentiated good can 
be defined as:  
.D
FFF
FD
xpN
Npyr =   (4.24) 
4.4. Firm Subsidies 
4.4.1. Subsidy Provision 
We analyse the effects of an average cost, or wage, subsidy financed by a 
proportional income tax, τ. A rationale for choosing such a subsidy policy is offered 
by Begg and Portes (1993) who find that relative to other types of subsidy policies, 
wage subsidies yield the greatest welfare gain 9 . We therefore assume that the 
domestic government grants a uniform subsidy, s, to all firms in the Y-sector for 
every unit of labour they employ. Proportional income tax is used both for simplicity, 
and because of the fact that such taxation generally constitutes a major component of 
government income worldwide. In the case of a small open economy, foreign 
expenditure is assumed as exogenous and unaffected by the domestic policy.  
Recalling that 1w = , the wage subsidy alters the cost and profit functions of 
each firm as follows:  
( )( )1 ,SsC y sα β= + −   (4.25) 
( ) ( )( )syyyp SFDDs −+−+= 1βαπ .  (4.26) 
The price each firm sets for its own product is now  
( )1
1s
s
p
σβ
σ
−
=
−
  (4.27) 
                                                 
9 Fleurbaey (1998) studies the resulting welfare effects using a general equilibrium model with 
monopolistic competition. He finds that when the government can either provide income subsidies or 
welfare payments, the former gives a larger welfare gain than the latter. 
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Inserting ps into the profit function and imposing the zero-profit condition, it easy to 
verify that the optimal size of each firm remains unchanged as before, i.e.  
( ).1β
σα −
=
Sy  
On the demand side, with a proportional tax, τ, imposed on the Home consumer 
and with the normalisation of 1AP = , the budget constraint is redefined as:  
( )1 .YL A P Yτ− = +   (4.28) 
The solution to the representative consumer’s optimisation problem, then results in 
the following allocation of expenditure over the two goods:  
( )1D
Y
L
Y
P
τ μ−
=   (4.29) 
and  
( )( )1 1DA Lτ μ= − − ,  (4.30) 
respectively. The corresponding indirect utility function of the representative 
consumer becomes  
( )1 .
Y
L
V
Pμ
τ−
=   (4.31) 
Taking foreign expenditure as constant, total demand for each variety is obtained to 
be:   
( ) σσμτ −− +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
=+ sF
Y
s
Y
FDD pE
P
p
P
Lyy 1   (4.32) 
with the corresponding domestic demand for each imported variety as  
( ) .1
σμτ −
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
=
Y
F
Y
D
F P
p
P
Lx   (4.33) 
The price index now becomes  
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The government’s budget constraint is now given by: 
sL N slτ =    
.sN sασ=   (4.35) 
From Eqs. (4.25) to (4.34), we can now restate the equilibrium conditions as follow. 
With the total labour demand of the differentiated sector given by NlLY =  and 
utilising Eq. (4.25), total costs of production incurred by the sector is 
( )( )syNNCs −+= 1βα  
( ).1 sN −= ασ   (4.36) 
From the demand of each domestic Y-variety from Eq. (4.32), we can obtain the total 
revenue of firms in the Y-sector to be 
( ) ( ) .1 11 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
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⎞
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=+ −
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s
Y
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s pEP
p
P
LNyyNp  (4.37) 
Equating Eqs. (4.36) and (4.37) to impose the zero-profit condition, and substituting 
in all equilibrium variables except L and N, we can obtain an equilibrium condition 
that gives the labour demand from the differentiated sector at the zero profit 
equilibrium:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) .01
1
1
111
11
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⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
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−
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−−−−
−
−
σσ
σβ
σ
σ
σβ
ασμτ
s
pNNsEsL FFsF  (4.38) 
Using Eq. (4.38) and Eq. (4.10) into the aggregate labour market equilibrium 
condition, we obtain the equilibrium labour demand for the A-sector.  
In the homogeneous good sector, similarly to the unsubsidised equilibrium case 
as given by Eq. (4.22), it is possible again that domestic supply may not meet 
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domestic demand with imports of the A-good accounting for the difference between 
domestic A-good expenditure and supply. With free trade, the A-good market 
equilibrium implies that total domestic supply and imports meets demand, or  
( )( )1 1 .S MA A Lτ μ+ = − −   (4.39) 
For the differentiated goods market, we obtain the market clearing condition from 
Eq. (4.16) and (4.32) which gives 
( ) ( ) σσμτ
β
σα
−
−
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⎛
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sE
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F
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 (4.40) 
The government budget constraint is given by: 
.sL N sτ ασ=  
The final equilibrium condition is given by the trade balance10:  
( ) 0M D DF F F s sA N p x N p x+ − = .  (4.41) 
We take s to be exogenous and assume that the government adjusts the tax rate 
to balance its budget. This reduces the endogenously determined variables to τ and 
Ns. We first examine qualitatively the existence and stability of the equilibrium in 
the [ ], Nτ  space. Denoting the differentiated goods market equilibrium as DGME 
and the government budget constraint as GBC respectively, we approximate them to 
straight lines, and depict them as shown in Figure 4-1. The locus of each line shows 
the combinations of τ and N that satisfy the labour market equilibrium condition and 
the government budget constraints.  
Beginning at any arbitrary point on the government budget constraint, consider a 
                                                 
10 It can be checked that any combination of two equilibrium conditions can be used to obtain the rest. 
As an example, in Appendix A1, the government budget constraint can be obtained using the trade 
balance and the labour market equilibrium. 
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ceteris paribus increase in N. This moves us to a new point on the GBC and 
increases government expenditure. The government will therefore have to raise the 
tax rate in order to finance the increase in subsidy, or N needs to fall in order for the 
government budget constraint to be satisfied, with the movement paths as shown by 
the horizontal arrows. Similarly, for the differentiated goods market equilibrium, at 
all points on DGME the differentiated good market clear – with the vertical arrows 
showing the movement paths above and below the locus. A ceteris paribus increase 
in τ takes us above the curve as it lowers disposable income and demand. This 
reduces profits and leads to exit of firms, hence N will fall and this reduces supply 
until the DGME is restored. The opposite holds below DGME. Hence, this curve 
slopes downwards.  
The equilibrium will be stable as long as the GBC is steeper than the DGME, 
such that starting from any arbitrary point between the two loci, the economy will 
converge to E as shown in Figure 4-1. The effect of a change (in this case, an 
increase) in the subsidy, s, can be examined qualitatively. This is indicated by a shift 
in both the GBC and the DGME as depicted by the dotted lines GBC' and DGME' 
that results in a higher N and τ with a new stable equilibrium point, E'. Using the 
differentiated goods market clearing condition and the government budget constraint, 
we can solve for the ad hoc (i.e. not optimal) general equilibrium values of τ and Ns 
in terms of the other exogenous variables. These are:  
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and 
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Analysing the ad hoc solutions for τ and Ns gives some interesting insights. Firstly, 
Eq. (4.43) shows that the use of a positive subsidy, accompanied by the associated 
positive tax, results in an increase in the number of firms in the Y-sector 11 . 
Specifically, differentiating Eq. (4.43) with respect to s yields:  
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Note that all the terms in Eq. (4.44) are positive: it therefore follows that 0>∂
∂
s
Ns , i.e. 
the total number of firms in the Y-sector is larger as a result of the subsidy. As each 
firm’s output remains unchanged post-subsidy, the larger number of firms, Ns thus 
translates into an unambiguously higher total output, Y. These results are similar to 
both Flam and Helpman (1987) and Bettendorf and Heijdra (2004) who consider the 
                                                 
11 Notice that the fraction comprised of the two terms in parenthesis in Eq. (4.42) is essentially the 
expression for Ns in Eq. (4.43). With 0>sN , it follows on that the ad hoc solution for τ is positive as 
α, s and σ all take positive values. 
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use of output or export subsidies. Secondly, given consumers’ love of variety, the 
larger number of varieties (firms) also suggests the possibility of the subsidy 
resulting in a higher level of social welfare12. Should this be the case, then an 
optimal policy tax-subsidy rule ought to exist. 
4.4.2. Welfare 
Previous contributions as mentioned in Section 4.2 seem to suggest ambiguous 
outcomes on the benefits of subsidy policies on a whole. Our intuition, however, 
points to a possible welfare increase as a result of the subsidy which we now 
examine. Therefore, using the ad hoc solutions for τ and Ns and making the other 
relevant substitutions into the indirect utility from Eq. (4.31), we get:  
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Differentiating with respect to s and evaluating at 0s = , the change in V gives  
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Hence, starting with a zero subsidy, a small increase in subsidy unambiguously 
                                                 
12 Recall the ‘love-of-variety’ aspect from the indirect utility function, V, where a larger N translates 
to a higher level of welfare. 
114 
increases welfare, with the driving force behind this effect stemming from the larger 
number of varieties now available for consumption. This stands, in particular, 
against Flam and Helpman (1987) who identify the possibility of a welfare loss 
when an output or export subsidy is given to Y-firms. In their model, while both 
subsidies induce new entry of firms into the domestic differentiated-good sector, the 
reduction in price of the Y-good potentially lowers the foreign price index of Y, 
leading to an increase in demand for domestic exports. Thus, while the subsidy leads 
to an increase in N which raises welfare, the fall in domestic consumption can 
override any gains such that the outcome is a net deterioration in welfare. 
In our case however, no such effect occurs from the subsidising of average costs, 
and this is due to our small open economy assumption which implies that real 
foreign expenditure is independent of N and any change in domestic consumption 
stems solely from a change in disposable income. Therefore, despite the fact that the 
higher level of taxation necessary to finance the policy lowers disposable income, 
the utility gain from the increase in varieties more than compensates for that lost 
from a reduction in the quantity of total consumption. Having established this, we 
now examine whether an optimal policy rule exists. 
4.4.2.1. Benchmark Calibration 
Owing to the complexity of the algebra involved, we illustrate the presence of an 
optimal policy using a series of numerical simulations. To determine the existence of 
an optimal policy rule, we make use of the initial equilibrium conditions together 
with the following parameter values of 01.0=α , 05.0=β , 32=μ , 5=N  and 
15=FN  to solve for the initial values of the other variables.  
For the elasticity of substitution, we follow the results found by Broda and 
Weinstein (2006). Using American data between 1970 and 2000, they estimated a 
115 
series of elasticities of substitution between various goods. They find that on average, 
the value of σ has decreased from 8 to 3 over the entire time period. Therefore, we 
use an average of their estimations, or 5σ = 13. The value of the subsidy, s, lies in 
the range of [ ]1,0 . Figure 4-2 shows the welfare effect when the subsidy is 
implemented. 
The shape of the utility function is concave. When a small subsidy is given, 
welfare first increases with the level of subsidy. However, this increase is not 
continuous as can be seen from Figure 4-2. Utility increases until it reaches a peak, 
beyond which it subsequently declines. The presence of such a peak indicates the 
existence of a welfare maximising subsidy rule14. The intuition behind this result is 
straightforward. When Y-sector firms are accorded a subsidy from the government, 
new firms enter the market as production costs are now lower. This introduces the 
availability of more varieties of the differentiated good for consumption. As 
consumers love variety, the increase in the number of varieties gives an increase in 
welfare. However, recall that consumers are taxed in order to finance the 
government’s subsidy bill. This in turn lowers disposable income, reducing the 
quantity consumed of both Y and A goods. Lower quantities of consumption 
contribute instead to lower welfare and work towards an offset of the welfare effect 
of a wider variety. Thus, to the left of the maximum in Figure 2, the increase in 
welfare from greater variety overrides the welfare loss from a reduction in 
consumption. Beyond the maximum, the benefit gained from consuming an 
additional variety of the Y-good is less than what is lost from the reduction in 
quantity consumed. The value of s corresponding to the peak is therefore the value 
                                                 
13 See Appendix A2 for calibration. 
14 The qualitative nature of the result holds for a range of values for β. See the numerical results in 
Table C-1. 
116 
of the subsidy which gives the highest level of social welfare. 
One noteworthy point of our result here is that it runs contra to that of Flam and 
Helpman (1987). They had established that the use of a tariff contributes to a 
positive terms-of-trade effect and subsequently raises welfare15. Using an export or 
output subsidy however, leads to a negative terms-of-trade effect and gives an 
ambiguous welfare outcome at best. Our choice of an average-cost subsidy similarly 
gives rise to a negative terms-of-trade effect16. Thus, coupled with the results from 
the tariff imposition, one could plausibly expect a resulting fall in welfare. 
Instead, this does not happen in our case. As NF is exogenous, the strictly 
positive gain in welfare starting from a small positive deviation from 0=s  is driven 
by the reallocation of resources which expands the Y-sector in both variety provision 
and aggregate output17. This subsequently corrects a distortion of ‘too few’ or ‘too 
little’ varieties and output in the monopolistically competitive sector. Thence, even 
with a deterioration in the terms-of-trade in our case, the subsidy helps correct this 
distortion and serves to generate a positive change in welfare. 
4.4.2.2. Size Effect 
A concern against the recommendation of any form of tax or subsidy policy in the 
presence of increasing returns is the lack of robustness in results. Apart from the 
results obtained by Markusen and Venables (1988), Klette (1994) further argued that 
another determining factor which affects the choice of the optimal policy rule in a 
small open economy relates to the size of the domestic differentiated sector relative 
to the rest of the world and the number of firms. He considers the case of an export 
                                                 
15 This is because the tariff induces new entry into the domestic differentiated sector, enlarging the 
scope of variety available for consumption, raising total output or both. 
16 Recall that there is a lowering of prices as shown from Eq. (4.27). 
17 As the output per firm remains unchanged post-subsidy, the positive change in N as found from Eq. 
(4.44) translates to an increase in aggregate output of Y. 
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subsidy provision by the home government and finds that when an economy 
becomes smaller relative to the rest-of-the-world, the welfare-improving policy can 
potentially switch from an export tax to an export subsidy.  
Thus, while we found the existence of an optimal subsidy level in our 
benchmark calibration, it is interesting to verify the robustness of our result to see if 
the relative size of the economy with respect to the rest of the world may potentially 
change the optimal policy rule. Using the same parameterisation values for α, β 
and μ, Figure 4-3 shows the welfare levels for a larger NF, e.g. 50=FN 18. 
It is clear that the main qualitative result of the existence of an optimal subsidy 
holds regardless of the value of NF. However, as NF gets larger (i.e. the small open 
economy becomes progressively smaller) the size of the optimal subsidy falls. In the 
limiting case of ∞→FN , we get 0→s , i.e. no intervention is the optimal policy. 
Thus, so long as a country is small such that ∞≠FN , there are still gains to welfare 
to be realised from subsidising the increasing returns to scale sector. 
4.4.2.3. No Initial Trade in A-good 
We also examine the case when there is no initial trade involved in the A-good, 
which implies that the market clearing condition for A is DS AA =  and that 
( )LLA μ−= 1 . Keeping the other parameters fixed, we thus solve for μ to obtain 
25.0=μ 19. As before, we then examine the welfare effect with the use of a subsidy 
within the range of [ ]1,0 . The results are shown in Figure 4-4. 
Even in this case, the implementation of a tax and subsidy policy combination 
raises welfare and there exists an optimal tax-subsidy rule. 
                                                 
18 To put this in context, consider small economies such as Singapore and Hong Kong in this case and 
economies such as Canada and Malaysia for the benchmark case. 
19 See Appendix A2. 
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4.4.3. Comparative Statics 
4.4.3.1. Effects to Labour Allocation and Output 
We now turn to examine the effect on output and labour allocation between sectors 
as a result of the subsidy provision. Using the ad hoc solutions for τ and Ns, total 
labour demand in the differentiated good sector can be obtained. This is now  
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Differentiating with respect to s and evaluating gives  
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which implies that total labour demand in the differentiated goods sector is now 
higher. With the initial assumption of a perfectly inelastic labour supply, reallocation 
of labour has to take place from the A-good sector to the Y-sector such that total 
output and, thence, imports of the A-good must increase correspondingly. 
Thus, a subsidy to firms in the Y-sector results in an increase in aggregate output 
of Y and simultaneously leads a reduction in output of the A-good. 
4.4.3.2. Trade Effects 
We can also determine the effects of the subsidy provision on the pattern of trade. 
Using the ad hoc solutions for τ and Ns with the expressions for PY, yFD and DFx  into 
the differentiated goods trade ratio, r, the post-subsidy trade ratio now becomes  
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The larger Ns and a smaller denominator in suggest that the value of r is now greater 
than that in Eq. (4.24). However, ps is now also smaller as a result of the subsidy. To 
resolve the ambiguity, we substitute for ps, Ns and τ, into Eq. (4.49) and differentiate 
with respect to s to obtain:   
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Thus, exports of the differentiated good have increased as a result of the subsidy 
provision.  
The underlying intuition for this can be explained as follows. A subsidy reduces 
the price of each variety of Home’s y-goods, and raises total demand for an 
individual firm’s product. This subsequently induces entry into the sector, thereby 
expanding the number of firms in equilibrium. With output per firm unchanged, 
DNpx  is now larger on aggregate. A secondary effect of the subsidy comes from the 
imposition of the proportional income tax to finance it. As pF is unchanged, a lower 
income of ( )1I Lτ= −  as a result of the tax simultaneously reduces domestic 
demand for imported varieties such that the value of DF F FN p x  is now smaller. In 
turn, the ratio r is now larger as compared to the pre-subsidy value. Thus a subsidy 
policy in this context amounts to having a concurrent export promotion and import 
substitution effect to the Y-good sector.  
We can thus identify the effect of the subsidy on the pattern of trade by 
analysing the impact of s on r. A value of 1=r  implies that the domestic economy 
exports as much differentiated goods as it imports. If 1>r , the domestic economy is 
a net exporter of Y-goods and a net importer of A. The reverse holds for 1<r . Using 
the parameter values from the benchmark calibration in Section 4.4.2.1, Figure 4-5 
shows the values of r for a range of s. Thus, the domestic economy is initially a net 
importer of differentiated goods. With the subsidy provision, its pattern of trade 
changes gradually until it finally becomes a net exporter of Y. The case where there 
is initially no trade in A is also examined, giving an identical result as shown in 
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Figure 4-6. With the provision of the subsidy, the domestic economy again becomes 
a net exporter of Y and a net importer of A. 
Our results thus far in Section 4.4.3 suggest the following. Industrial policy in 
the form of industry subsidies not only raises the aggregate output of the 
monopolistically competitive sector, it also leads to a shift in the pattern of trade 
away from the A-good to the country becoming a net exporter of the increasing 
returns to scale Y-good. Furthermore, corroborating this are the results from Section 
4.4.2 indicating there are welfare gains from the subsidy provision. This could make 
such a policy instrument attractive to implement for a country looking at some form 
of import substitution or export promotion of the increasing returns to scale sector. 
4.5. Conclusion 
In summary, we explored the plausibility for the use of a tax-subsidy combination as 
a policy tool in the context of a small open economy in this chapter. Our primary 
results indicate that such a policy potentially leads to an improvement in welfare 
with the main driver being an increase in the number of varieties of Y-goods 
available for consumption. We also find the presence of the existence of an optimal 
subsidy level which is welfare maximising. Our results are consistent within a range 
of plausible parameter values which take into account different cost levels, 
expenditure shares and the size of the domestic economy. Thus, our findings also 
help towards resolving some of the ambiguity present within the existing economic 
literature. 
Besides affecting the level of welfare, the use of subsidies as a policy instrument 
also gives rise to other effects in the economy. Subsidies to firms in the increasing 
returns to scale sector potentially results in a reallocation of labour in favour of the 
differentiated sector, thereby leading to a corresponding contraction of output (and 
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size) of the homogeneous sector. Another finding is the shift in exports of the 
economy in favour of the differentiated good, leading to an inflow of the 
homogeneous good. The underlying mechanism driving this stems from the subsidy 
creating a concurrent import-substitution and export-promoting type of outcome. 
From a more practical perspective, our results appear to point in general to the 
validity of use of policies which favour the industrial sectors of the economy by 
governments. The crux of the argument here is that the presence of imperfectly 
competitive markets, such as monopolistic competition as used here, generates 
socially sub-optimal welfare outcomes. This creates a rationale for the use of 
government intervention to correct for this welfare sub-optimality. The use of a 
subsidy to average costs, or analogously wages, financed by the imposition of an 
income tax corrects this sub-optimality, resulting in a greater level of social welfare. 
This then can offer some theoretical explanation for the experience of countries such 
as Japan and France, as mentioned at the start of this chapter, which have used 
industry support policies. 
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Appendix 
A. Mathematical Derivations 
A1. Deriving the Government Budget Constraint 
We can check that Walras’ Law holds by using the trade balance and the labour 
market equilibrium condition to obtain the government’s budget constraint.  
We first rewrite the trade balance from Eq. (4.23) as:  
( )( )( ) ( )( ) 011 =−−+−−− DFFFDSssA xpNyypNLL τμ  
This can be rearranged to yield: 
( )( )( ) ( )( ) 011 =+−+−−− DFFFDssSssA xpNypNypNLL τμ , 
where NspsyS is the total revenue in the Y-sector and the second term in brackets 
within the same parenthesis is total domestic expenditure on the differentiated good. 
The zero-profit condition requires total revenue to equal total costs. Total costs is the 
total wage bill incurred by all firms in the sector, ( )sNl −1 , while total expenditure 
is given by the demand function from Eq. (4.29) multiplied by the price index, or 
( ) Lμτ−1 . Substituting into the trade balance, this becomes:  
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 01111 =−−−+−−− LslNLL sA μττμ . 
Using the labour market equilibrium of lNLL sA +=  and substituting into the trade 
balance, this simplifies to give the government budget constraint, i.e.: 
slNL s=τ . 
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A2. Calibration 
This section lays out the equations and solutions used to calibrate the model for the 
numerical simulations presented in Section 4.4.4. To calibrate the model, we make 
use of the initial equilibrium set out in Section 4.3.1 with the following assumptions. 
In the context of a small open economy, NF, pF and ΕF are taken as exogenous. Also, 
as labour supply is exogenous, the initial values found for the parameter L is thus 
also taken as fixed. 
Using the expression for N in Eq. (4.19), we can solve for ΕF in terms of α, β, μ, 
σ, L, pF, N and NF. This gives 
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Substituting the values for each variable will yield the initial value for ΕF. We 
assume further that 1−== σ
σβppF . Initial values of both ΕF and pF can be obtained by 
substituting values for N, NF, α, β, μ and σ.  
Numerical values for pF and EF can now be obtained using a set of plausible 
parameter values. For a benchmark, the values used for the calibration are 01.0=α , 
05.0=β , 2 3μ = , 1=L , 5=N  and 15=FN 20. The value of the elasticity of 
substitution follows on from the average of the values obtained by Broda and 
Weinstein (2006), or 5σ = . The second simulation uses the same values for N, α, β, 
μ and σ, but NF is increased in this case to 50.  
                                                 
20 The choice of 15=FN , can be justified on the grounds that the concept of ‘small’ is relative. In 
this sense, we can take 5 to be small relative to 15. Using 50=FN  for the second case examines how 
‘size’, i.e. how small the economy is relative to the rest of the world, affects the optimum subsidy. 
What we mean by small is that the economy cannot affect the world market size and the aggregate 
price index of the differentiated good.   
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Finally, substituting the found numerical values of pF and ΕF together with the 
values for α, β, and μ, N, NF and L into V and evaluating the welfare levels for the 
range [ ]0,1s =  yields each of the results as illustrated in Figures 2-3. The numerical 
values of these solutions are found in Table C-1 in Appendix C. 
In the final case where there is no trade in the A-good, the value of μ is solved to 
find the expenditure share in which no trade in the A-good takes place initially, or 
the conditions that  
0=− DS AA   
and  
0=− DFFF
FD xpNNpy  
hold. This implies 
( ) 01 =−− LLA μ   
and  
NlL =μ . 
Substituting for yl βα +=  and y and solving yields 
L
Nασμ = . 
Using the values of 5=N , 01.0=α  and 5σ = , we get 
.25.0=μ  
The initial and post-subsidy values of V are reported in Table C-2 in Appendix C.   
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B. Graphs 
Figure 4-1: Equilibrium of N and τ with an Average Cost Subsidy 
 
Figure 4-2: Benchmark Calibration 
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Figure 4-3: Subsidies and Welfare when 50=FN   
 
 
Figure 4-4: Subsidy and Welfare levels with no Initial A-good Trade 
 
 
s
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
V
11.8
12.0
12.2
12.4
12.6
12.8
s
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
V
2.37
2.38
2.39
2.40
2.41
2.42
2.43
2.44
128 
Figure 4-5: Y-good Trade Ratio in the Benchmark Case. 
 
 
Figure 4-6: Y-good Trade Ratio with no Initial Trade in A. 
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C. Numerical Results 
Table C-1: With Trade in Both Goods 
32,15 == μFN  EF pF p V 
05.0=β      
Initial values 6102543.0 −×  0.0625 0.0625 10.4613 
Subsidy used     
1.0=s    0.0563 10.7966 
15.0=s    0.0531 9.6040 
08.0=β      
Initial values 5101667.0 −×  0.1000 0.1000 7.6472 
Subsidy used     
1.0=s    0.0900 7.8923 
15.0=s    0.0850 7.0206 
10.0=β      
Initial values 5104069.0 −×  0.1250 0.1250 6.5902 
Subsidy used     
1.0=s    0.1125 6.8014 
15.0=s    0.1063 6.0502 
32,50 == μFN      
05.0=β      
Initial values 6105780.0 −×  0.0625 0.0625 12.3825 
Subsidy used     
01.0=s    0.0619 12.7255 
03.0=s    0.0594 6.9045 
The initial value of N is taken to be 5 while the other parameters kept constant are 
01.0=α , 5=σ  and 1=L . 
 
Table C-2: No initial trade in the A-good 
25.0=μ  EF pF p V 
Initial values 6105722.0 −×  0.0625 0.0625 2.4118 
Subsidy used     
01.0=s    0.0619 2.4328 
05.0=s    0.0594 1.9754 
The initial value of N is taken to be 5, with 15=FN , 01.0=α , 05.0=β , 5=σ  
and 1=L . 
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Chapter 5  
Conclusion 
5.1. Summary of Main Findings 
Market imperfections such as informational coordination failures and scale 
economies (as we have used in this thesis) provide a basis for governments to 
intervene in the economy. Evidence such as that documented by Charlton (2003) 
suggests that there does appear to be relatively widespread use of subsidies as a form 
of government interventionist policy in the economy. However, the review of the 
empirical literature by Pack and Saggi (2006) does not suggest that this type of 
intervention is unambiguously beneficial in terms of welfare: empirical analysis of 
the use of subsidy provisions on indicators such as factor productivity, growth rates 
and industry size seem to give no conclusive evidence of its desirability, and 
suggests instead that a stance of non-intervention may still be still the ideal option. 
Thus, our original motivation for the analysis in this thesis was to determine 
whether there was any theoretical justification for governments to implement 
subsidy provisions as a form of industrial policy. Our results provide an answer to 
two key questions we asked at the beginning of this thesis: (i) Why do subsidies 
continue to be used if empirically, they do not seem to give any beneficial outcomes, 
(ii) are there any gains to society which are not captured within existing numerical 
indicators?  
Using a non-monetary macroeconomic model with one factor of production, 
labour, and two produced goods, a homogeneous good and a differentiated 
commodity, we examined the effects arising from the provision of subsidies by the 
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government to firms in the differentiated goods sector. The differentiated sector is 
modelled as monopolistically competitive where firms produce a variety of 
imperfect substitutes with internal increasing returns to scale in production. From 
our findings, there are three main results which contribute to the existing economic 
literature. 
First, production-cost reducing subsidies to the monopolistically competitive 
firms lead to either: (i) an increase in the mass of varieties of the differentiated good, 
(ii) a higher aggregate supply of the differentiated good, or (iii) an increase in both 
the mass of available varieties and aggregate supply. However, disposable income 
falls as a result of the use of a proportional income tax to fund the subsidy. In spite 
of this, we find that the net welfare effect of the subsidy is always positive. This 
result is robust to the type of subsidy used. 
Second, when labour supply is endogenously determined, the tax induces a 
higher labour supply that offsets the reduction in disposable income. While firms 
now experience lower production costs due to the subsidy, the increase in the level 
of economic activity helps in expanding the differentiated goods sector further, 
which again leads to a higher level of welfare. Furthermore, the elasticity of labour 
supply does not play a role in determining the optimal policy rule. 
Third, an optimal positive subsidy level which raises social welfare to a higher 
level always exists. This result holds regardless of whether the use of production 
subsidies is examined within the context of a closed or an open economy. In the 
closed economy, the elasticity of substitution between varieties plays a key role in 
determining the level of the optimal subsidy. In the small open economy context, it 
appears also that the size of the domestic economy relative to the world impacts the 
magnitude, but not the sign of the optimal subsidy. 
 132
In a perfectly competitive environment, economic theory suggests that any form 
of government intervention in the economy creates distortions and results in an 
inefficient allocation of resources. Yet, the existence of a deviation away from 
perfectly competitive settings, such as the presence of a monopolistically 
competitive goods market, can imply that some form of government intervention 
may bring about Pareto improvements. A substantial volume of work that explores 
this comes under the framework of New Keynesian macroeconomics which is 
characterised by the existence of some form of market imperfection into the analysis. 
Costa and Dixon (2010) present a recent survey of the developments within this field 
pertaining specifically to the use of fiscal policy. Their overall conclusions are that 
some form of relationship does exist between the use of fiscal policy and welfare. 
However, it is less certain if there are indeed welfare gains arising from the use of 
government expenditure to influence aggregate demand. 
Conversely, the results we have presented in this thesis show that there are 
always gains to welfare when subsidy provisions are used to influence the level of 
aggregate supply. Therefore, what we can conclude with some confidence is that, as 
opposed to the more often analysed Keynesian-type policy of aggregate demand 
management, subsidies used for aggregate supply management could actually be a 
plausible and viable alternative policy tool for policy makers to consider instead. 
5.2. Policy Applicability 
Our results can potentially offer compelling insights which are useful towards policy 
deliberations. For example, the results from Chapter 2 can help reconcile the 
apparent discrepancy between the widespread use of subsidies and the empirical 
results that seem to suggest that they are not beneficial. Subsidies act through a 
reduction in prices, and lead to increased consumption in quantity or the number of 
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varieties consumed. This subsequently results in a higher level of welfare to the 
individual, one which is unlikely to be captured in numerical measures such as 
growth rates or total factor productivity figures. Our results in Chapter 3 offer 
insights which can be useful towards labour market policy formulation, some of 
which were previously discussed and we will not repeat them here.  
Chapter 4 brings some relevance to the international trade arena. Essentially, 
while the combination of free trade and abstaining from market intervention do 
bring Pareto improvements1, welfare remains lower as compared to what it could be 
under perfect competition. This sub-optimality is inherent owing to the presence of 
imperfect markets and provides an incentive for some policy introduction by a 
benevolent government. That welfare gains are still possible from the use of a 
production subsidy thus remains a legitimate cause for implementation to correct for 
this sub-optimality 
Overall, the findings from each chapter potentially provides a case on its own for 
a government to consider enacting some form of industrial subsidy policy. 
5.3. Limitations 
A note of caution may however be important here. Our results should not be 
interpreted to mean that subsidies are justified for use or should be used, but that 
they can potentially yield welfare benefits. In spite of the positive results we have 
obtained, especially with regards to welfare gains, we cannot claim that our analysis 
can or ought to be translated into direct policy implementation purposes. We have 
constructed a very compact and stylised economic model for our analysis. While this 
is potentially desirable in order to keep our analysis manageable and tractable, this 
‘reduced form’ of analysis also presents several other limitations. 
                                                 
1 See Krugman (1987) for a discussion on this.  
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First, labour and firms are assumed to be identical. This can easily make one 
sceptical about the applicability of our results as observations of wage and firm size 
differences are regularly observed2. Second, our analyses were conducted in a static 
model, with the condition that the government budget constraint always balances. 
This can in essence be a very strong and, very possibly, unrealistic assumption in 
view of large government deficits observed in many countries. Thus, using a model 
such as that exemplified in Costa and Dixon (2010) and allowing for a one-period 
budget deficit in our analysis may perhaps offer a more rounded and persuasive 
argument. Finally, there is no clear quantitative evidence or methodology which can 
empirically verify our findings at present. 
Thus, these aspects need to be taken into account before making any policy 
recommendations based on the preceding analysis. 
5.4. Extensions 
The work presented thus far in this thesis offers several potential avenues for further 
exploration. We list a few here for future consideration. 
Two immediate extensions to the theoretical framework developed in this thesis 
are worth considering for future exploration. The first would entail relaxing the 
assumption of there being only one factor of production. Taking a lead from McCool 
(1982), incorporating capital as a factor input into the increasing returns to scale 
sector with the use of factor-specific subsidies clearly will undoubtedly give added 
insights.  A second extension could consist of including a more realistic form of the 
labour market. We have followed much of the existing literature by assuming labour 
                                                 
2 Two possible ways of resolving this could be to incorporate individual firm heterogeneity into the 
firms’ production costs following Montagna (2001) or Melitz (2003), or heterogeneous labour as in 
Yeaple (2005). See also Molana and Montagna (2000) for an analysis of fiscal policy with firm-
heterogeneity in a closed economy framework. However, this could possibly come at a cost of 
analytical tractability in arriving at explicit solutions as we have obtained. 
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as homogenous and freely mobile between sectors. Labour supply is either treated 
exogenously or individuals are free to choose the quantity of labour supplied and 
with the labour market clearing, the economy is always in a state of full employment. 
Yet, it is more probable that some degree of matching incompatibility would exist in 
labour moving between sectors and resulting in some level of involuntary 
unemployment. Attempting to incorporate this into our model could yield some 
insightful results. As a start, the recent seminal contribution of Blanchard and Galí 
(2010) introduced a labour tightness index as an unemployment measure along with 
hiring costs into a New Keynesian monetary model. Using this, they studied the role 
of monetary policy as an unemployment determinant or for stabilisation purposes. 
Considering a similar framework and applying it in our context of subsidy policies 
could prove a potentially interesting avenue to pursue. 
Other areas which could also be particularly interesting include the incorporation 
of a monetary sector into the model or the migration to other fields such as the New 
Economic Geography. We did not include a monetary sector, in line with many of 
the similar New Keynesian macroeconomic models concerned with the use of fiscal 
policy. For realism however, including a monetary sector will clearly be desirable3. 
Molana (2000) demonstrates that when an individual’s utility function includes a 
preference for money holdings, a non-trivial multiplier effect can still result even 
though money is neutral. This presents another avenue for future work to advance on. 
Finally, the open economy formulation in Chapter 4 of this thesis offers a host of 
other areas to consider. One such would be the field of the New Economic 
Geography. Matsuyama (1995) covers briefly the implications of factor mobility and 
firm dispersion across regions as a result of monopolistic competition. This offers 
                                                 
3 As mentioned by Bénassy (1993), the economy Walras had constructed was a barter economy, but it 
is quite evident that barter trade hardly ever exists anymore. 
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promise for a deeper look-in, of which Dupont and Martin (2006) have previously 
provided a precedent. 
5.5. Closing Comments 
Chand (2004) argues that micro-founded models such as the one we have 
constructed in this thesis are not particularly well-suited for policy makers to use in 
their policy deliberations, owing in part to an aggregation problem of diverse 
individuals. This raises doubt as to how well suited a ‘macroeconomic’ model is for 
policy analysis if it is essentially a ‘microeconomic’ to begin with. However, he also 
quotes a statement from Keynes who says that “The object of our analysis is not to 
provide a machine or method of blind manipulation, which will furnish an infallible 
answer, but to provide ourselves with an organised and orderly method of thinking 
out particular problems…” 
This is an essential point which we want to emphasise. We feel that the biggest 
advantage of what we presented in this thesis is the clarity of outcomes. What we 
have illustrated is that the use of a subsidy can lead the economy to a Pareto-
improvement in a constrained optimum. This further gives us confidence that the 
policy relevance of our findings is very much valid. There will undoubtedly be other 
barriers such as information asymmetry and various non-economic frictions which 
will prevent easy translation of our results into policy reality. And it should also be 
reminded here that the economy will not be in a first-best situation even with the use 
of the subsidy. But the lack of ambiguity of the results obtained from our analyses 
can provide a firm base for policy deliberations to start and systematically build 
upon. 
In conclusion, this thesis has examined the effects of providing production 
subsidies to imperfectly competitive firms within a general equilibrium framework. 
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Our primary findings show that there are welfare gains to be obtained from the use 
of production subsidies and we have also derived and showed the existence of a set 
of optimal policy rules, all of which can hold potential for policy considerations. We 
have also briefly explored some avenues for future research that offer scope for new 
and rich insights to be obtained. 
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